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PANHANDLING FOR CHANGE IN CANADIAN LAW
DINA GRASER*
RiSUMEk
Au cours de la derni~re d~cennie, le probl~me de mendicit6 dans les grandes villes
aux ttats-Unis et au Canada a entrain6 une augmentation des mesures l6gislatives
prises par les municipalit~s, les ttats et les provinces. Cet article d~crit les contest-
ations juridiques relatives aux lois antimendicit6 pr~sentement en cours au Canada,
analyse les revendications canadiennes en vertu de la Charte canadienne des droits et
liberts et pr~sente les r~sultats de contestations semblables aux ttats-Unis.
Dans cet article, l'auteure indique que les motifs de telles lois constituent un < mythe
de la beaut6 >> de l'ordre public imposd par les gouvernements qui ont, par des
compressions draconiennes dans les programmes sociaux, engendr6 le probl~me qu'ils
tentent maintenant de r6gler. L'auteure insiste sur le fait que les lois antimendicit6
criminalisent les pauvres, censurent la critique des probl~mes sociaux et font en sorte
que les rues et les endroits publics sont visuellement nettoy~s au detriment de la
population en g~n~ral. L'article examine comment de telles interventions lgislatives
entrent en conflit grave avec les valeurs de la libert6 d'expression, des libert6s
individuelles et de la dignit6 humaine qui sous-tendent la Charte, et se termine par un
aperqu du traitement r~serv6 par les tribunaux des 8tats-Unis A des causes similaires.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the "panhandling problem" in major cities in the U.S. and Canada
has brought about a growing body of legislative responses by municipalities, states
and provinces. This is not a new phenomenon. For centuries, cities around the world
have tried to find a way to deal with street people, who have been variously classified
as indigents, vagrants, tramps, the homeless or simply the poor. Measures for coping
with begging and panhandling in particular have ranged from the institution of
poorhouses and parish charities to government relief programs and workfare.'
* Dina Graser is entering her third year as a student in the Faculty of Law at the University of Toronto.
The author thanks the following for their assistance and advice: Prof. Lorraine Weinrib and Mary
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1. For a complete discussion of the history of regulating such populations, see F. Fox Piven and R. A.
Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Random House, 1971).
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This article describes legal challenges to anti-panhandling laws currently underway in
Canada, sets out an analysis of the Canadian claims under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms,2 and canvasses the judicial results of similar challenges in the United States.
a) Definition of Terms and Scope of this Paper
Laws which restrict or ban begging are often part of general "nuisance" legislation
governing behaviour in public spaces. This paper centres on the effect of such legislation
on panhandlers, whom I define as those who ask passers-by for financial assistance
in public places, whether by speech or by conduct. I also restrict my definition to those
whose conduct is peaceable, as legislation defensible under the Charter already exists
in most cities to capture conduct that is abusive, threatening or disorderly.3 The terms
"panhandler" and "beggar" will be used interchangeably in this article.
One of the challenges in making Charter arguments on behalf of panhandlers, particularly
under section 15, is the difficulty in locating them within a specific group: for example,
"the poor" and "the homeless" are terms which are often used interchangeably in
describing those who panhandle. However, while all those who panhandle can almost
always be called poor, not all the poor panhandle. Similarly, those who panhandle may
be homeless, but panhandling may also be a means by which they purchase shelter,
either on a temporary or permanent basis. In theory, both homelessness and poverty
can also be seen as mutable states; many poor people move in and out of homelessness
and could arguably move in and out of conditions of poverty. However, since regula-
tions of the sort discussed in this article tend to be aimed at the visibly poor, and since
chronic poverty tends to be a difficult category to escape, I will use the general
category of poverty as a group within which panhandlers can be located.
The causes of poverty are complex, and are well documented in books and articles
across Canada and the U.S.4 This paper does not deal with the root causes of begging
and homelessness, except as they are incidental to the argument. This article also limits
2. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), hereinafter
the Charter.
3. For example the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, Chapter C-46 [hereinafter the Criminal Code], s.
264.(1) Criminal harassment ("No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another
person is harassed or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct.. .that
causes that other person reasonably, in all of the circumstances, to fear for their safety or the safety of
anyone known to them"; s. 264.1(1) Uttering Threats; s. 265.(1) Assault (including attempted assault,
threatened assault, or begging while openly wearing or carrying a real or imitation weapon); s. 269.
Unlawfully causing bodily harm; etc.
4. See, for example Regulating the Poor, supra note 1; D.A. Snow and L. Anderson, Down on Their
Luck: A Study of Homeless Street People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); J. D.
Wright, B. A. Rubin, J. A. Devine, Beside the Golden Door: Policy, Politics and the Homeless (New
York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998); T. O'Reilly-Fleming, Down and Out in Canada: Homeless Canadians
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 1993); Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force, Taking
Responsibility for Homelessness: An Action Plan for Toronto (Toronto: City of Toronto, 1999); S.
Gaetz, B. O'Grady, B. Vaillancourt, Making Money: The Shout Clinic Report on Homeless Youth
and Employment (Toronto: Central Toronto Community Health Centres, 1999).
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its discussion of efforts to regulate panhandling to urban areas, where the phenomenon
is most apparent and most troubling.
b) The "Beauty Myth" of Public Order
While governments ascribe a variety of purposes to anti-panhandling legislation, the
underlying motive of all of the ordinances can fairly be described as answering a
perceived need for public order. Large numbers of beggars on the street indicate a
social problem of major and growing proportions. The prevailing view was set out
eloquently in the introduction to a New York District Court judgment, Loper v. New
York:5
As Alfred Hitchcock, the master of cinematographic terror and suspense, is reported
to have said, "terror results from disorder," and begging, the subject of the statute
here under constitutional attack, over time has been viewed as the archetypical
expression of disorder. Since the early days of western civilization, people have
sought to define the conduct that violates society's sense of order and that which
society permits or even encourages. Yet, as civilization as a whole has moved
forward, people have learned time and again that suppressing speech and conduct
deemed contrary to a society's sense of order merely masks the underlying disorder.
These motions for summary judgment require the resolution of a modern-day con-
stitutional challenge to a statute which provides that loitering for the purpose of
begging is a crime.6
Anti-panhandling legislation is a governmental attempt to "take back the streets" for
those members of urban communities who are not poor. A common theme in American
academic writing on the subject is "compassion fatigue" - the impatience and growing
intolerance on the part of the public with being confronted with the needy on a daily
basis.7 The view taken by governments, as put by Robert Ellickson, is that "to be truly
public, a space must be orderly enough to invite the entry of a large majority of those
who come to it. Just as disruptive forces at a town meeting may lower citizen
attendance, chronic panhandlers, bench squatters, and other disorderly people may
deter some citizens from gathering in the agora." 8 It is noteworthy that even in this
introductory extract from Ellickson's article, panhandlers and "bench squatters" are
characterized as disorderly, even though they may be sitting or standing in a completely
non-intrusive way. To Ellickson, and to the governments who enact anti-panhandling
legislation, the very existence of panhandlers suggests disorder. This normative assumption
is in tension with those who view beggars as part of a natural plurality of a city, and
who see the beggar's message as a crucial signifier of the social structure of the day.
Ellickson's standpoint is also informed by those who espouse the "Broken Windows"
5. 802 F.Supp. 1029.
6. Ibid. at 1031 [internal footnotes omitted].
7. See R.C. Ellickson, "Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows,
and Public-Space Zoning" (1996) 105 Yale U. 1165 [hereinafter "Chronic Misconduct"], and N. Millich,
"Compassion Fatigue and the First Amendment: Are the Homeless Constitutional Castaways?"
(1994) 27 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 255 [hereinafter "Compassion Fatigue"].
8. "Chronic Misconduct," supra note 7 at 1174.
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theory. As put forth by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson in their original landmark
artic le in The Atlantic Monthly,9 small signs of disorder-such as broken windows-
give rise to a sense that nobody cares about the community, and paves the way for
more serious criminal activities. This thesis has been used, for example, to justify
crackdowns on crime and on the homeless in New York (although it has not been
proved that cracking down on homelessness per se has reduced crime). Kelling himself
has been careful not to espouse the current trend towards "zero tolerance" so popular
in current policing philosophy. At the 1997 Jane Jacobs conference in Toronto (Ideas
that Matter) he spoke of the need to use negotiation and persuasion rather than force
in dealing with street people. He stressed the importance of police collaboration with
local community organizations to reduce opportunities for "disorderly behaviour." In
his article, he notes the ethical dilemmas caused by arresting street people on charges such
as "vagrancy" or "public drunkenness"---charges with scarcely any legal meaning"' 0 and
clearly recognizes other concerns: "How do we ensure.. .that the police do not become
the agents of neighborhood bigotry? We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this
important question.""II Yet, he still favours the criminalization of panhandling.
Such criminalization sets up two false equations. The first is that removing beggars
from the streets will actually eliminate beggars. The second is that, in making the
public feel safe, they actually are safe. Both are dangerously simplistic notions which
contribute to the "beauty myth" of public order. In this paper, I suggest that anti-pan-
handling laws criminalize the poor, censor criticism of social problems, and visually
sanitize streets and public places to the detriment of society at large. I also argue that
such legislative actions are in serious conflict with the values of free expression,
individual liberty and human dignity which underlie the Charter.
II. CANADIAN CASES IN PROCESS
Several Canadian cities have enacted anti-panhandling by-laws,12 two of which are
currently the subject of challenge in the courts. In addition, the Province of Ontario
recently passed the Safe Streets Act, a province-wide version of the municipal by-laws.
While each law differs slightly, the general approach is the same in each. A more
thorough examination of the purposes and constitutionality of these laws is set out in
section III of this paper. The relevant provisions of the by-laws of Vancouver and
9. J. Q. Wilson and G. Kelling, "Fixing Broken Windows" (1982) The Atlantic Monthly 29; see also G.
Kelling and C. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Com-
munities (New York: Martin Kessler Books, 1996).
10. Ibid. at 35.
11. Ibid. It is also worth noting that, at a 1997 seminar of the Institute for Economic Affairs in London,
England, William J. Bratton, the former Commissioner of Police of New York City, made it clear that the
concept of zero tolerance was "inadmissable in police work, the only exceptions, perhaps, being drug use
and corruption within the police force." J. Young, "Zero Tolerance: Back to the Future" in Planning Safer
Communities, ed. A. Marlow and J. Pitts (Lyme Regis: Russell House Publishing, 1998).
12. Cities with some form of anti-panhandling or anti-squeegeeing legislation include Saint John, NB;
Vancouver, BC; Sudbury, ON; Winnipeg, MB; Saskatoon, SK; Qu6bec City, QC; Edmonton, AB;
Calgary, AB; Kingston ON; and Hamilton, ON.
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Winnipeg and the current status of the claims are set out below. In addition, a short
section deals with Ottawa's anti-panhandling by-law, which was rescinded in January
of 2000.
A. Vancouver
A By-law to Regulate and Control Panhandling 13
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF VANCOUVER, in open meeting assembled,
enacts as follows:
1. This By-law may be cited as the "Panhandling By-law".
2. In this By-law
"panhandle" means to beg for or, without consideration, ask for money, donations,
goods or other things of value whether by spoken, written or printed word or bodily
gesture for one's self or for any other person but does not include soliciting for
charity by the holder of a license for soliciting for charity under the provisions of
the License By-law,
"street" includes a public road, highway, bridge, viaduct, lane and sidewalk and
any other way normally open to the use of the public, but does not include a private
right-of-way on private property,
3. No person shall panhandle on a street within 10 m of
(a) an entrance to a bank, credit union or trust company,
(b) an automated teller machine,
(c) a bus stop,
(d) a bus shelter, or
(e) the entrance to a liquor store.
4. No person shall panhandle from an occupant of a motor vehicle which is
(a) parked,
(b) stopped at a traffic control signal, or
(c) standing temporarily for the purpose of loading or unloading.
5. No person shall panhandle on a street at any time during the period from sunset
to sunrise.
6. No person shall sit or lie on a street for the purpose of panhandling.
7. No person shall continue to panhandle on a street from a person after that person
has made a negative response.
9. Every person who commits an offence against this By-law is liable to a fine and
penalty of not more than $2,000 and not less than $100 for each offence.
For the most part, this by-law is tailored to address panhandling in specific locations.
However, it is noteworthy that in addition to restricting such activity to within ten
13. City of Vancouver, By-law No. 7885, Panhandling By-law (30 April 1998).
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metres of banks, bus stops, liquor stores, etc., it also imposes a form of "blanket ban"
in clause 6, which states "No person shall sit or lie on a street for the purpose of
panhandling." This seems to assume that a standing panhandler is less offensive than
someone who merely sits on the street with a baseball cap in front of them. This is
peculiar, since a standing or walking panhandler is arguably more intrusive to a
passerby than a sitting panhandler. It is also overly broad, since the same person who
sits on a street with his cap in front of him may not be panhandling at all, but may
simply be tired. As a result, it opens the door for arbitrary enforcement by officials
and catches conduct which may be completely innocent.
The B.C. Public Interest Advocacy Centre (BCPIAC) is representing three groups
14
who are filing a claim challenging the constitutionality of the by-law. While preparing
the claim, a panhandler actually received a ticket and BCPIAC intended to support his
challenge in provincial court. However, when the City of Vancouver received notice
of the challenge and the intent to put forth a constitutional question, the City dropped
the charges. Only one ticket has ever been given in Vancouver, but panhandlers in the
City claim they are nonetheless being harassed to "move along" under threat of being
ticketed. Because it is unlikely that the City will press charges against anyone else at
this point, and because of the relative inability of panhandlers to pursue a challenge
even if they did, BCPIAC's clients are planning to sue for a declaration from the
Supreme Court of B.C. that the law is contrary to the Charter and ultra vires as an
invalid exercise by a municipality of federal criminal law power. They will also argue
that the municipality exceeded its authority under the provincial legislation, i.e., that
there is no authority in the Vancouver Charter for the City of Vancouver to pass a
by-law regulating individuals about the time, place and method of panhandling, nor
to enact a by-law that discriminates between classes of individuals. No trial date has
yet been set.
B. Winnipeg
Winnipeg's by-law is titled "A By-law of the City of Winnipeg to regulate and control
panhandling."' 15
THE CITY OF WINNIPEG, in Council assembled, and not withstanding the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacts as follows:
1. This By-law may be cited as "The Panhandling By-law".
"panhandle" means to beg or ask, whether by spoken, written or printed word, for
donations of money or other things of value for one's self or for any other person,
except where the solicitation has been authorized pursuant to The Charities
Endorsement Act;
14. The federated anti-poverty groups of B.C., the National Anti-Poverty Organization and End Legis-
lated Poverty Society.
15. City of Winnipeg, By-law No. 6555/95, A By-law of THE CITY OF WINNIPEG to regulate and
control panhandling (26 January 1995).
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"street" means any roadway, sidewalk, boulevard, place or way, which the public is
ordinarily entitled or permitted to use for the passage of vehicles or pedestrians and
includes a structure located in any of those areas;
3. No person shall panhandle within 10 metres of:
(a) the main entrance to a bank, credit union or trust company;
(b) an automatic teller machine;
(c) a public entrance to a hospital;
(d) a bus stop; or
(e) a bus shelter.
6. No person shall panhandle from an occupant of a motor vehicle which is:
(a) parked;
(b) stopped at a traffic control signal; or
(c) standing temporarily for the purpose of loading or unloading.
7. No person shall panhandle after sunset.
8 No person shall continue to panhandle from a person, or follow a person, after
that person has made a negative response.
9. Penalties for the failure to comply with the provisions of this By-law shall be in
accordance with Section 149 of The City of Winnipeg Act which provides:
"149(1) Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with ...
(b) a provision of.. .a by-law...for which no other penalty is provided in this Act, is
guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding $1000 in the case of an indi-
vidual or... to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or to both.
149(3) The justice imposing a penalty on a person under subsection (1) may, in
addition to imposing the penalty, order the person to observe the provision that was
breached ..."
Like the Vancouver by-law, the Winnipeg ordinance is tailored to address panhandling
in specific locations and at specific times. While it does not have a "blanket ban"
provision on sitting or lying in roadways, it does, peculiarly, use wording similar to
section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, commonly known as the "notwith-
standing clause," in its preamble. The notwithstanding clause gives a province the right
to "opt out" of the Charter for the purposes of passing certain legislation for a period
of five years. However, that section can only be invoked by "Parliament or the
legislature of a province" and only in relation to statutes or parts of statutes passed by
those bodies. It is clear that Winnipeg City Council is not a legislature, nor are their
by-laws "an Act of the legislature" which can operate notwithstanding sections 2, 7
or 15 of the Charter. It is also clear that by incorporating this provision in its preamble,
the City of Winnipeg is indicating its awareness that the by-law is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge.
The National Anti-Poverty Organization has been granted standing to pursue a claim
at the Court of Queen's Bench and is being represented by the Public Interest Law
Centre (PILC) in Winnipeg. The by-law is being challenged both on a jurisdictional
basis, similar to that in Vancouver, and on constitutional grounds. PILC will be making
arguments under Charter sections 15 (the equality provision), 2(b) (freedom of
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expression) and 7 (life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice).
Under section 15, they are arguing that the ordinance denies panhandlers equal
protection and benefit of the law and equality before and under the law. They submit
that the by-law singles out panhandlers from the rest of the population regardless of
whether or not they are causing any disturbance, essentially so that "the general
population may avoid the discomfort of proximity to indigents on the street" 16 and
that, both in form and substance, panhandlers are denied the right to use and enjoy
public space based on personal characteristics which are analogous to grounds of
discrimination listed in the Charter. The section 2 argument rests on the simple fact
that panhandling is a form of expression denied by the by-law. Under section 7, the
by-law is said to infringe the liberty interest because of a potential jail term for an
offence; as in Vancouver, PILC is also arguing that it is counter to the principles of
fundamental justice because it is overbroad, catching peaceful conduct that is "inca-
pable of causing any blameworthy harm."' 7 They are seeking a declaration that the
law contravenes the Charter and is ultra vires. A trial date has been set for February
of 2000.
C. Ottawa
In Ottawa, the anti-panhandling provision was one of several included in a by-law
under the general heading of public nuisances:
18
WHEREAS the purpose of this by-law is to provide for an environment free from
certain public nuisances which may degrade the quality and tranquillit of life:
THEREFORE the Council of the Corporation of the City of Ottawa enacts as
follows:
BEGGING
1. No person shall go from door to door in private or commercial and business
establishments or place himself in or upon any highway or public place to beg or
receive alms for himself or any other person, association or corporation, save and
except, donations requested on behalf of institutions corporate or otherwise which
are established for charitable purposes.
IA. The provisions of Section 1 shall not apply to street performers or street musi-
cians who receive voluntary public contributions for their performance.
OFFENSE
8. Every person who contravenes any of the provisions of this by-law is guilty of
an offense and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than five thousand
($5,000) dollars, exclusive of costs.
16. Taken from Statement of Claim filed by PILC on behalf of NAPO in 1995.
17. Ibid
18. City of Ottawa, By-law No. 117-91, A by-law of The Corporation of the City of Ottawa respecting
public nuisances (15 May 1991).
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Of the three Canadian by-laws under discussion here, this is the only one which could
properly be called a "blanket ban." No effort was made to tailor this ordinance at all
with the exception of an exemption for street performers or musicians. As such, it was
the one most vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
A panhandler received a ticket under this by-law in 1999 and a trial date was set for
February of 2000. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association had planned to intervene
in the case. As in the other two cities, a declaration of invalidity and unconstitutionality
under the Charter would have been sought, based on the infringement of sections 2,
7 and 15 using similar arguments to those being made in Winnipeg. In light of the
generality of the provision, a compelling argument existed that the legislation was not
only overbroad, but targeted panhandlers by virtue of their perceived status rather than
by their activities.
In the fall of 1999, however, the Province of Ontario introduced Bill 8, the Safe Streets
Act. Once this bill took effect (on January 31, 2000), the city of Ottawa rescinded its
own anti-panhandling by-law, presumably finding it redundant, and withdrew the
charges against the claimant.
D. The Safe Streets Act
Ontario's recently enacted Safe Streets Act prohibits not only aggressive solicitation,
but any solicitation of a "captive audience" in specified locations, similar to the
Vancouver and Winnipeg by-laws. It also prohibits the disposal of "certain dangerous
things" in public places, including used condoms, syringes and broken glass. Punish-
ment for either panhandling or disposing dangerous items is a first-time fine of $500,
followed by up to $1000 or imprisonment for up to six months for subsequent
convictions. Relevant provisions are set out below:
Bill 8, 199919
An Act to promote safety in Ontario by prohibiting aggressive solicitation, solicita-
tion of persons in certain places and disposal of dangerous things in certain places,
and to amend the Highway Traffic Act to regulate certain activities on roadways
Definition
1. In sections 2 and 3,
"solicit" means to request, in person, the immediate provision of money or another
thing of value, regardless of whether consideration is offered or provided in return,
using the spoken, written or printed word, a gesture or other means.
2. (1) In this section,
"aggressive manner" means a manner that is likely to cause a reasonable person to
be concerned for his or her safety or security.
Solicitation in aggressive manner prohibited
19. Province of Ontario, Bill 8, 1999, Safe Streets Act, 1999 (31 January 2000).
(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy
(2) No person shall solicit in an aggressive manner.
Examples
1. Threatening the person solicited with physical harm, by word, gesture or other
means, during the solicitation or after the person solicited responds or fails to
respond to the solicitation.
2. Obstructing the path of the person solicited during the solicitation or after the
person solicited responds or fails to respond to the solicitation.
3. Using abusive language during the solicitation or after the person solicited
responds or fails to respond to the solicitation.
4. Proceeding behind, alongside or ahead of the person solicited during the solicita-
tion or after the person solicited responds or fails to respond to the solicitation.
5. Soliciting while intoxicated by alcohol or drugs.
6. Continuing to solicit a person in a persistent manner after the person has
responded negatively to the solicitation.
Solicitation of captive audience prohibited
(2) No person shall,
(a) solicit a person who is using, waiting to use, or departing from an automated
teller machine;
(b) solicit a person who is using or waiting to use a pay telephone or a public toilet
facility;
(c) solicit a person who is waiting at a taxi stand or a public transit stop;
(d) solicit a person who is in or on a public transit vehicle;
(e) solicit a person who is in the process of getting in, out of, on or off a vehicle or
who is in a parking lot; or
(f) while on a roadway, solicit a person who is in or on a stopped, standing or
parked vehicle.
Offence
5. (1) Every person who contravenes section 2, 3 or 4 is guilty of an offence and is
liable,
(a) on a first conviction, to a fine of not more than $500; and
(b) on each subsequent conviction, to a fine of not more than $1,000 or to imprison-
ment for a term of not more than six months, or to both.
Arrest without warrant
6. A police officer who believes on reasonable and probable grounds that a person
has contravened section 2, 3 or 4 may arrest the person without warrant if,
(a) before the alleged contravention of section 2, 3 or 4, the police officer directed
the person not to engage in activity that contravenes that section; or
(b) the police officer believes on reasonable and probable grounds that it is neces-
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sary to arrest the person without warrant in order to establish the identity of the per-
son or to prevent the person from continuing or repeating the contravention.
At the time of this writing, no charges have yet been laid under this legislation;
however, should the police choose to enforce it aggressively, it seems likely that a
constitutional challenge will result. It is odd that aggressive panhandling is included
at all in this legislation, since such behaviour is already covered under the Criminal
Code20 (and thus could be subject to a challenge that such criminalization is ultra vires
the powers of the province); it also conflates aggressive panhandling with solicitation
by those who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, although drunk panhandlers
are not necessarily aggressive. Additionally, this law criminalizes much non-aggres-
sive panhandling, and by including clauses about the disposal of condoms, syringes
and broken glass, suggests by inference that all panhandlers are prostitutes, drug
dealers or petty criminals. Few would dispute the necessity for curbing aggressive
panhandling or would disagree with the prohibitions on disposing of dangerous items.
However, the juxtaposition of these items with non-aggressive panhandling signifies
an attitude which is prejudicial at the least and dangerously discriminatory when taken
to its logical conclusion.
III. PANHANDLING LEGISLATION UNDER THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS
AND FREEDOMS: AN ANALYSIS
As noted above, the criminalization of panhandling can be seen to breach three
separate rights under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: section 2 (freedom of
expression); section 7 (life, liberty and security of the person); and section 15 (the
equality guarantee). I argue that these breaches are interrelated. Anti-begging laws
infringe freedom of expression by depriving a panhandler of the ability to express his
need, which is a valid and protected form of communication. Limiting expression
results in a corresponding deprivation of liberty and security of the person on both the
physical and psychological plane, because if a beggar can't communicate his hunger,
he can't exercise his chosen means to address it-and may have no other means of
subsistence available. By restricting expression in this form, the laws also act as blunt
weapons to regulate the visible poor, an identifiable and historically disadvantaged
group, which conflicts with the Charter's purported protection of vulnerable groups
and its section 15 guarantee of equality before and under the law. Taken together, these
infringements show that the state is acting in a fashion clearly inconsistent with the
values underlying our Charter of Rights.
A. Section 2 (b) Freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication
1. Scope of the Right
Freedom of expression is a fundamental freedom under the Charter of Rights, and is
one of the core values of a democratic society. 21 Unlike in the United States, freedom
20. See the Criminal Code, supra note 3.
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of expression in Canada has almost unlimited scope. As determined by the court in
Irwin Toy,
"Expression" has both a content and a form, and the two can be inextricably connected.
Activity is expressive if it attempts to convey meaning. That meaning is its content.
Freedom of expression was entrenched in our Constitution ... so as to ensure that
everyone can manifest their thoughts, opinions, beliefs, indeed all expressions of the
heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the mainstream Such
protection is, in the words of both the Canadian and Quebec Charters, 'fiudamen-
tal" because in a free, pluralistic and democratic society we prize a diversity of ideas
and opinions for their inherent value both to the community and to the individual... If
the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and
primafacie falls within the scope of the guarantee. 22
The right to freedom of expression is subject to a broad and purposive interpretation
in the context of the ideals the right was meant to protect.23 As summarized by Dickson
C.J. in R. v. Keegstra,24 these ideals include:
(1) seeking and attaining truth is an inherently good activity;
(2) participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged;
and
(3) diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be
cultivated in a tolerant and welcoming environment for the sake of both those'
who convey a meaning and those to whom the meaning is conveyed. 25
2. The Irwin Toy Test
The Irwin Toy test has two stages: first, does the activity convey a meaning and thus
fall under the sphere of 2(b)? 26 Regardless of what kind of speech begging is deemed
to be, the simple act of communication involved in asking for assistance undoubtedly
conveys meaning as understood by the freedom of expression guarantee.
The second part of the Irwin Toy test asks whether the government's restriction of speech
is the purpose or simply the effect of a given law.2 7 As explained by Dickson C.J.C.,
If the government's purpose is to restrict a form of expression in order to control
access by others to the meaning being conveyed or to control the ability of the one
conveying the meaning to do so, it also limits the guarantee. On the other hand,
where the government aims to control only the physical consequences of certain
21. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney-General), [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter Irwin Toy].
22. Ibid. at 968-69 [emphasis added]. The only exception to the guarantee of freedom of expression is
violence: Ibid at 970.
23. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [ 1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
24. [ 1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra].
25. Ibid. at 727-728.
26. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 968-69.
27. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 972-73.
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human activity, regardless of the meaning being conveyed, its purpose is not to
control expression.28
In this case, the stated purpose of the three municipal panhandling by-laws under
challenge both "controls access by others to the meaning being conveyed" and controls
the ability of a panhandler to convey meaning by restricting where and when such
expression can (or cannot) take place. Even were the by-laws to pass the purpose test,
their effects, as I will discuss below, not only infringe but directly contravene the
purpose of the right of freedom of expression.
3. Begging: Political or Commercial Speech?
i) Panhandling as "Political" Speech
The Supreme Court of Canada approaches every section 2(b) case by exploring the
interests of the individual and the nature of the speech being restricted in light of these
traditional values. While every activity which has "meaning" is protected, it is clear
that some expressions are closer to the core of the right than others. Of central
importance is the concept of free speech as essential to the functioning of democracy.
In R. v. Kopyto, Cory J.A. (as he then was) wrote: 29
The very lifeblood of democracy is the free exchange of ideas and opinions. If these
exchanges are stifled, democratic government itself is threatened... History has
repeatedly demonstrated that the first step taken by totalitarian regimes is to muzzle
the media and then the individual in order to prevent the dissemination of views and
opinions that may be contrary to those of the government. The vital importance of
freedom of expression cannot be overemphasized. 30
Panhandling has much in common with political speech, in that the need which is
expressed and received conveys basic truths about our social condition. It is direct
communication which traditionally takes place in public areas (such as streets, parks
and plazas) where people tend to congregate. Criminologist Joe Hermer argues that
"the activity of 'passing by' and that of being a 'passer-by' is an extremely important
form of conduct that constitutes the social relations of public space [and] is part of a
wider communicative sphere" which includes such other means of communication as
postering, leafleting and peaceful picketing or demonstrations. 31 Writers Helen
Hershkoff and Adam Cohen note that "views about the way in which society should
be ordered are implicit in the beggar's request for money. Her plea is a direct challenge
to prevailing assumptions about the social responsibilities that members of a commu-
nity owe to each other."32
28. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 974.
29. R. v. Kopyto (1987), 24 O.A.C. 81 [hereinafter Kopyto].
30. Ibid at 91.
31. Letter from J. Hermer to Dina Graser, 28 November 1999, referencing Policing Compassion: The
Governance of Begging in Public Space (D.Ph. Thesis, Faculty of Social Studies, University of
Oxford. 1999) [unpublished].
32. H. Hershkoff and A. S. Cohen, "Begging to Differ: The First Amendment and the Right to Beg"
(1991) 104 lHarvard Law Review 896 at 899.
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Speech does not have to be overtly political to be political in effect. It is doubtful that
many panhandlers, if questioned, would say that asking for change is a political
statement. Yet, an expression of need-the very presence of beggars-clearly makes
a political statement, whether intentionally or unintentionally. People are bothered by
the sight of homeless people, I would argue, not so much because they feel harassed
when asked for change-although that may be the case in some instances-but
because, as Professor David Snow says, it's part of "the question of maintenance of
social order."33 When behaviour is not controlled and/or institutionalized, people
become nervous; they sense that the social order is breaking down. 34 Since the
government is generally responsible for maintaining social order (how things really
are, as opposed to the public order, which is how things appear to be) the visible
presence of people on the street is an implicit criticism of the system. When there are
beggars on the street, something isn't working. The expression of need thus becomes
a comment on the social order; ironically, the more beggars there are, the more political
their presence becomes. However discomfiting it may be to receive, such expression
is a vital component of democratic reality. The "marketplace of ideas" finds in
panhandling a valid form of expression that speaks a certain truth, and thus deserves
not only to be voiced but to be heard and debated: as U.S. Supreme Court Judge
Brennan wrote in Lamont v. Postmaster General in 1965, "[iut would be a barren
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers." 35 In trying to legislate
panhandling away, the government is trying to hide the visual manifestation of a range
of social problems, rather than addressing those problems directly. Less charitably
put, the government is trying to censor expression which reflects badly upon itself.
Such action is in serious conflict with the values of free exchange and participatory
democracy which lie behind the right of freedom of expression.
Anti-panhandling by-laws also target a group which has few other channels of com-
munication. As noted by L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Committee for the Commonwealth of
Canada v. Canada:36
If members of the public had no right whatsoever to distribute leaflets or engage in
other expressive activity on government-owned property (except with permission),
then there would be little if any opportunity to exercise their rights of freedom of
expression. Only those with enough wealth to own land, or mass media facilities
(whose ownership is largely concentrated), would be able to engage in free expres-
sion. This would subvert achievement of the Charter's basic purpose as identified
by this Court, i.e., the free exchange of ideas, open debate of public affairs, the
effective working of democratic institutions and the pursuit of knowledge and truth.
These eminent goals would be frustrated if for practical purposes, only the favoured
few have any avenue to communicate with the public.37
33. Interview with Prof. D. Snow, 2 November 1999.
34. Ibid.
35. 381 U.S. 301, 85 S.Ct. 1493, 1497 (1965).
36. [1991] 1 S.C.R. 139 [hereinafter Commonwealth].
37. Ibid. at 198.
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The poor are unlikely to have recourse to avenues other than direct communication.
The underlying values of the Charter, which include human dignity, equality, and the
protection of vulnerable groups, are called into play by this legislation. In essence,
by-laws such as these can be seen as the criminalization of poverty-a theme to which
I will return in my section 15 analysis.
ii) Begging as Commercial Speech
Commercial expression can be defined as that which is motivated primarily by the
desire for profit. Advertising is an invitation to participate in a commercial transaction:
it is arm's length solicitation with the same goal of exchange as its eventual end point.
If one defines profit as financial gain, 38 then on its face, begging is an economic
transaction. Beggars rarely offer a tangible good in exchange for money. Indeed, the
dictionary definition of "beg" is to "ask for (food, money, etc.) as a gift." 39 Such
expression is close to that of charitable solicitation, which offers only the altruistic
benefit of supporting a worthy cause in exchange for a donation. It is not, in contractual
terms, an "invitation to treat." As such, calling begging simply commercial speech is
inaccurate. However, even if begging were to be considered commercial speech, it
would still be protected under section 2(b) in light of Canadian jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court has resisted following the U.S. Supreme Court in overtly assigning
different levels of protection to various kinds of speech. In the first Charter case to
deal with the subject, Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),4° the Court made an
emphatic statement about the need to include commercial expression within the scope
of 2(b) protection:
Given the earlier pronouncements of this Court to the effect that the rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the Canadian Charter should be given a large and liberal
interpretation, there is no sound basis on which commercial expression can be
excluded from the protection of s. 2(b) of the Charter... Over and above its intrinsic
value as expression, commercial expression which, as has been pointed out, protects
listeners as well as speakers, plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make
informed economic choices, an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and per-
sonal autonomy. The Court accordingly rejects the view that commercial expression
serves no individual or societal value in a free and democratic society and for this
reason is undeserving of any constitutional protection.4'
While some commentators have resisted the categorization of economic choices as a
constitutional value, 42 this inclusive approach seemed a promising start to civil
38. Profit is defined as "financial gain" in the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, ed. K. Barber, (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1998) at 1155
39. Canadian Oxford Dictionary, ibid. at 119 - see also s.v. panhandle, at 1050, "beg for money in the
street."
40. [198812 S.C.R. 712 [hereinafter Ford].
41. Ibid. at 767.
42. See, e.g., L. E. Weinrib, "Does Money Talk? Commercial Expression in the Canadian Constitutional
Context" in D. Schneiderman, ed., Freedom of Expression and the Charter, (Calgary: Thomson
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libertarians. In its next major case dealing with section 2(b), however, the court began
qualifying its perspective. In Irwin Toy, the court referred to the traditional values
underlying the right of free expression, and noted that when dealing with legislation
which contravened the right in effect rather than as its purpose, a more specific
justification on the plaintiff's part was required:
The precise and complete articulation of what kinds of activity promote these prin-
ciples is, of course, a matter for judicial appreciation to be developed on a case by
case basis. But the plaintiff must at least identify the meaning being conveyed and
how it relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual
self-fulfillment and human flourishing. 43
In other words, the "intrinsic value of expression" espoused in Ford was no longer
quite enough. Yet, the court in Irwin Toy did not address how advertising directed at
children fulfilled one of the three traditional rationales for freedom of expression. Nor
did they address how a constitutional document, designed to protect individual rights
vis-a-vis the state, can protect corporate rights; or how a "corporate person" is to relate
to a concept such as individual self-fulfillment. In Ford, the court dealt with this
problem by judging the speech in question partly by its value to the receiver, as well
as to the speaker. There, the power of economic choice was seen as enabling the
fulfillment of individual autonomy on the consumer's part. However, it is worth noting
that the issue in Ford was not simply commercial speech, but the larger question of
economic and political participation by a linguistic minority, which brought it closer
to the "core" values underlying the section 2(b) right.
A year later in Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario,44 the court
struggled again with the question of commercial speech. The expression under
consideration in Rocket was advertising by dentists, which McLachlin J. characterized
as being motivated by economic considerations:
[Tlheir loss ... is merely loss of profit, and not loss of opportunity to participate in
the political process or the "marketplace of ideas", or to realize one's spiritual or
artistic self-fulfillment ... This suggests that restrictions on expression of this kind
might be easier to justify than other infringements of s. 2(b).45
McLachlin J. seemed to infer that expression motivated by profit is less important
than other forms of expression, quoting Wilson J. in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta
(Attorney General):46 "not all expression is equally worthy of protection. Nor are
all infringements of free expression equally serious." Yet, she decided that such
expression was an important factor in enhancing informed consumer decision-mak-
ing in the choice of a dentist. Unlike in Irwin Toy, where the advertising at issue
Professional Publishing Canada, 1991).
43. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 977.
44. [ 1990] 2 S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter Rocket].
45. Ibid. at 247.
46. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326
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was not considered to be of particular value to the children who were solicited (in fact,
the question was whether such advertising was harmful) Rocket squarely set out the
tension between the "value" of choice to the consumer and the profit-making
purpose of commercial expression.
McLachlin J. seemed to suggest in Rocket that the profit motive behind the expression
makes it less worthy of stringent protection than other speech tied to the traditional
values underlying the right. Yet, in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral),47 she wrote:
(J)ust as care must be taken not to overvalue the legislative objective beyond its
actual parameters, so care must be taken not to undervalue the expression at issue.
Commercial speech, while arguably less important than some forms of speech,
nevertheless should not be lightly dismissed.
While this Court has stated that restrictions on commercial speech may be easier to
justify than other infringements, no link between the claimant's motivation and the
degree of protection has been recognized. Book sellers, newspaper owners, toy
sellers - all are linked by their shareholders' desire to profit from the corporation's
business activity, whether the expression sought to be protected is closely linked to
the core values of freedom of expression or not. In my view, motivation to profit is
irrelevant to the determination of whether the government has established that the
law is reasonable orjustified as an infringement offreedom of expression.48
If advertising cigarettes is protected, advertising to children is protected and advertis-
ing of dentists is protected, it seems that begging-regardless of any economic
motivation from which it springs-should be equally protected under the section 2(b)
guarantee. The aspect of begging which is commercial in character is protected, just
as that aspect of begging which is political in character is protected. Yet the jurispru-
dence reveals that the Supreme Court has categorized speech in the first stage of
analysis, if only to inform the standard of proof required under section 1. As
Bastarache J. wrote in Thomson Newspapers v. The Attorney General of Canada:4 9
"[tihe degree of constitutional protection may vary depending on the nature of the
expression at issue... This is not because a lower standard is applied, but because
the low value of the expression may be more easily outweighed by the government
objective." 50 In defining the character of speech, the Court also defines the value of
that speech, which in turn raises or lowers the justificatory standard required of the
government.
Notwithstanding this nuance, begging is indisputably speech; anti-panhandling laws
are directed at regulating that speech. Both aspects of the Irwin Toy test are met. Thus
a section 1 analysis which investigates the context and legitimacy of such restrictions
47. [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter RJR]
48. Ibid. at 347 [emphasis added].
49. [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 [hereinafter Thomson].
50. Ibid. at 943.
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is required, weighing the purpose of the by-laws to determine if such infringements
may be "reasonably justified in a free and democratic society."
'51
3. Section One Analysis
Once a right is found to have been infringed, the investigation passes to a section 1
analysis. Section 1 of the Charter states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." 52 As stated in R. v. Oakes53 and modified in Dagenais v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp.,54 the test for determining if a right can be limited under section
1 consists of, a) deciding if the state has a pressing and substantial interest served by
the legislation; and if so, b) the proportionality test: is the legislation rationally
connected to the objective? Are the means chosen minimally impairing of the right in
question? Is the effect of the limit proportionate to the legislative objective? Do the
salutary effects of the legislation outweigh its deleterious effects? 55 I argue that the
purposes of anti-panhandling legislation are not substantial enough to outweigh the
infringement of a fundamental freedom, and that even if the objectives were important
enough to pass the first stage of the Oakes test, it would fail the second stage
proportionality test.
a) Is the government's objective "pressing and substantial"?
Standard of Review
The purpose of the Oakes test is to scrutinize whether government legislation has an
objective compelling enough to justify violating a Charter right. The right of freedom
of expression has generally been held to demand a particularly strict standard of
justification. In discussing this issue, both L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in her concurring
reasons in Commonwealth and McLachlin J. in her Keegstra dissent referred to the
writings of the philosopher F. Schauer.56 McLachlin J. wrote specifically of the
standard of review required in cases involving infringements of freedori of expression:
Rather than evaluating expression to see why it might be worthy of protection,
Schauer evaluates the reasons why a government might attempt to limit expression.
Schauer points out that throughout history, attempts to restrict expression have
accounted for a disproportionate share of governmental blunders... Professor Schauer
explains this peculiar inability of censoring governments to avoid mistakes by the
fact that, in limiting expression, governments often act as judge in their own cause.
They have an interest in stilling criticism of themselves, or even in enhancing their
own popularity by silencing unpopular expression. These motives may render them
51. Charter, supra note 2 (s. 1).
52. Ibid.
53. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
54. Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835.
55. Oakes, supra note 53 at 136-139.
56. F. F. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982).
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unable to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of suppression in many
instances. That is not to say that it is always illegitimate for governments to curtail
expression, but government attempts to do so must prima facie be viewed with
suspicion.57
Because of the importance ascribed to the right of freedom of expression, its place as
a "fundamental freedom" and the caution that democratic societies should direct
towards governmental attempts to restrict expression, a strict standard of review is
generally required.
As noted above, Dickson C.J.C. wrote that freedom of speech could be infringed either
in purpose or effect. If a government's purpose was to restrict speech directly, or to
restrict the access of others to an expression being conveyed, then it was clearly an
infringement of the right. But if the government's purpose was aimed at different
mischief, and the restriction of speech was an ancillary effect of the legislation, the
burden then lay on the plaintiff to prove that the speech which was effectively
restricted related in some way to the values surrounding the right (i.e. the search for
truth, political participation and individual self-fulfillment).58
This seems to set a double standard: in the case at hand, if legislation restricting
begging is seen as a limitation of speech per se, or as an attempt to regulate when,
where and how such speech can take place, then such a law infringes the right because
it is aimed at content. The plaintiff does not have to prove the actual value of that
speech; the onus lies on the government to justify its restriction of it, which is the
exercise undertaken in a section one analysis. If, however, a government argues that
the purpose of a law is, say, traffic control, and the restriction of speech is merely
ancillary to that purpose, then the onus lies on the beggar to explain how his speech
relates to the values surrounding the right of expression before the government's
justification even takes place in the analysis. At this point, the difference between a
hot dog vendor and a panhandler becomes clear. A municipal by-law forbidding, for
example, any commercial transactions from taking place outside a theatre between the
hours of 7 PM and 8 PM in order to allow theatregoers unimpeded entrance to the
doorway could theoretically be upheld, since it would not aim to restrict speech but
to control crowds. The hot dog vendor could presumably stand near the lineup and
call out "Great hot dogs down at the corner!" without contravening the by-law. The
beggar's transaction, however, is intrinsic to his expression: whether silent or spoken,
the request for funds is both expression and transaction, the more so because of the
lack of exchange component. Every law aimed at restricting begging is therefore
restricting content, regardless of how it is worded.
Another issue factored into this dynamic by the court in Irwin Toy was that of judicial
deference to legislative choice. The court noted the difference between situations in
which the legislature was acting to protect a vulnerable group or mediating between
different groups in society, and those instances where the state was "best characterized
57. Keegstra, supra note 24 at 805.
58. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 977.
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as the singular antagonist of the individual whose right has been infringed," 59 for
example in criminal law. In the latter circumstances, the court would be more watchful
of individual rights; in the former, the court would tend to cede responsibility for
mediating between groups to the legislature.
Begging can fall into either category. On one hand, since the laws carry penal
sanctions, the state is in the role of the antagonist. Thus, such laws merit a higher
standard of review by the courts. On the other hand, the objective of the legislation,
as discussed below, can also be reduced to the maintenance of public order, interpreted
as removing an element displeasing to the majority from view. This is where the
distinction between begging as commercial or political speech becomes relevant.
Governments regulate commercial enterprises all the time, through such vehicles as
vending permits and zoning regulations. This could be seen as mediating between
competing groups who wish to use the same public space for different purposes. What
is the difference between telling our hot dog vendor that he can't sell sausages outside
a theatre, and telling a beggar that he can't beg outside a theatre? Both individuals
affected could protest that their income, and thus their very livelihood, is being
affected by the actions of the state in the name of public order. As discussed above,
however, a restriction of vending is not necessarily a restriction on expression, while
a restriction of begging surely is. "Brother, can you spare a dime?" is a request for
funds which meets an economic imperative, but also expresses much more: it is an
appeal to a passerby's generosity, based on a recognition of income disparity which
in itself makes a political statement about our society. Directly or indirectly, therefore,
a beggar's speech is political in nature. This, combined with the penal nature of the
sanctions imposed, requires a stringent standard of review on the part of the courts.
b) Purpose of the laws: Public Order
While the by-laws passed in Ottawa, Vancouver and Winnipeg differ somewhat, they
share similar characteristics, as noted in section II, infra, and their overriding purpose
can be seen as an attempt to impose a sense of "public order." In each city, there is an
underlying presumption that governments can enact such legislation by virtue of their
ownership of public property, probably pursuant to provincial powers in subsection
92(13) (property and civil fights), s. 92(10) (Local Works and Undertakings) and
subsection 92(16) (matters of a local or private nature) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
In Ottawa, the additional purpose of the (now rescinded) by-law, "to provide for an
environment free from certain public nuisances which may degrade the quality and
tranquillity of life," further reveals the public order objective. Ontario's Safe Streets
Act (part of which amends the Highway Traffic Act) purports to protect "safety," but
its real motivation, as revealed in government press releases, is more psychological
than real: "Ontario's three justice ministers today said that 1999 was a year of solid
progress toward giving families peace of mind about the safety of their neigh-
bourhoods," leads one release, which also quotes Solicitor General David Tsubouchi
as stating "[p]eople have the right not only to be safe, but also to feel safe."
60
59. Ibid. at 994.
60. Government of Ontario, Press Release "Harris government acting to make Ontario a safer place" (30
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There is no question that, in general, governments have the authority to regulate public
property in the furtherance of public order. Traffic regulations, littering provisions,
opening and closing hours for bars, and zoning regulations are just some of the myriad
of municipal by-laws to this end. The question at hand, however, is not whether it is
within the purview of governments to make legislation for the furtherance of public
order. The question is whether the purpose of this particular kind of legislation-i.e.
anti-panhandling laws-is pressing and substantial enough to override a constitution-
ally protected right, and whether blanket bans in particular can be justified.
The Ottawa by-law was the most explicit in its purpose: "to provide for an environment
free from certain public nuisances which may degrade the quality and tranquillity of
life." The first question-defining the "environment"-can fairly be understood as
public streets and public areas in general. As discussed below, these locations are
traditional centres for public discourse of all varieties. As such, the government bears
the burden of proving that its objective is substantial enough to override a right which
has existed in such arenas for centuries.
The second issue is the tricky one of defining what constitutes quality of life, a vague
term which sets out an irretrievably subjective standard. For example: some people
enjoy music on the street, whether it comes from store doorways or live artists, because
they perceive it as giving the city vitality and rhythm. However, others complain
bitterly that such forms of music constitute simple noise and are irritating in the
extreme. One person's life is enriched by the same causes which arguably degrade
another's. Numerous examples of this paradox exist and it is doubtful whether, in the
absence of genuinely dangerous, criminal or threatening behaviour, social consensus
can easily be found on such issues.
These laws impose a hierarchy, dividing those who are "nuisances" or whose behavi-
our constitutes a nuisance, from those who are "not." In this case, the line is explicitly
drawn: panhandlers are on one side, and everybody else is on the other. The objective
of the laws works against the quality of life and the tranquillity of panhandlers; by
virtue of this legislation, they are deemed less worthy of respect and consideration
than everyone else. Further, pursuant to the Ontario legislation, they are considered
an automatic threat to safety, regardless of their actual comportment on the street.
Few people are untroubled by the sight of homeless people who beg for alms, either
actively or passively. Homelessness is not pretty. But people who are solicited for
change will generally react, au moment, in one of three ways: by giving change; by
ignoring the request; or by answering verbally in some way. As a momentary distur-
bance, it may indeed interfere with someone's tranquillity; as Ellickson argues,
repeated disturbances may become more irritating. 61 However, those who do give may
also experience a sense of momentary well-being (the classic byproduct of charity so
promoted by various religions.) If someone does not want to give, she can simply walk
away without being impeded in her progress. Begging does not generally interfere
December 1999).
61. "Chronic Misconduct", supra note 7 at 1169.
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with the normal functioning of a street, i.e. pedestrian and vehicular traffic, roadside
commercial operations, parades, social gatherings, etc. As the American court wrote
in Loper: "the potential listener's control over this situation is ultimately indistinguish-
able from his control over the situation in which protected forms of speech are thrust
upon him by persons soliciting contributions for charitable organizations on the street
or by persons pamphleteering for religious or political causes on his doorstep."
62
The notions of "quality of life" and "tranquillity" seem oddly unprepossessing when
compared with the infringement of a fundamental freedom. There are many daily and
equally "chronic" events which disturb tranquillity as much or more than panhandling:
road work which causes drivers to detour far out of their way during rush hour; a brass
band marching by a funeral home; the side effects of a children's baseball game
crashing through the window of a home bordering on a public park; picket lines during
labour disturbances; overenthusiastic street vendors; or dogs that won't stop barking.
Yet, none of these nuisances are legislated out of sight.
The purposes of the laws also rest on two erroneous premises. First and most
importantly, governments assume that people should not see something which may
disturb their tranquillity: in this case, the need of other human beings. This gives short
shrift to the notion of democracy, which depends for its vitality on a pluralism of views.
It can be argued that begging serves an important social purpose by raising awareness
of conditions of poverty. Furthermore, it may stimulate debate or impel some people
to work to change the situation, either through political lobbying or direct involvement
with agencies who work to alleviate poverty and homelessness.
Secondly, the laws rely on a fallacious notion that in making the problem disappear
from a visual standpoint, it really will go away; in other words, that the disease of
poverty or homelessness will be cured by removing panhandlers, its most visible
symptom, from the public eye. This notion of recreating the urban picture was
discussed by Joe Hermer in his article about loitering laws in Oshawa, "Keeping
Oshawa Beautiful". He wrote:
The construction of the public nuisance of the loiterer as a visual figure committing
offenses against community space enabled officials to construct and deploy a regu-
latory imaginary which could be governed by an official "vision" of the future ...
the power of the police to "move on" public nuisances is suggestive of a technique
where people are moved out of sight, out of a picture of an acceptable public... The
ability of officials to forge a discourse of regulation through techniques of visualiza-
tion is so strong that even the most serious concerns about the by-law---that it could
offend constitutional rights and liberties and that it was considered ultra vires-
could not compete with how the loiterer was visualized as an immoral figure."
'63
62. Loper, supra note 5 at 1045.
63. J. Hermer, "Keeping Oshawa Beautiful: Policing the Loiterer in Public Nuisance By-Law 72-94"
(1997). 12:1 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 17 at 188-89 [emphasis in original].
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We live in an era where appearances are often more important than reality. The age of
television, mass marketing, glossy magazines and shopping malls have delivered the
triumph of image over substance. We have become a society addicted to the quick fix:
faster is better, cleaner is safer. But do most citizens really believe that forbidding
panhandling will alleviate poverty or make beggars disappear? The notion of tranquil-
lity rests on an assumption that if people are not presented with images of need on a
daily basis, they will not worry about it. In fact, such by-laws merely shift the problem
to somewhere else. As pointed out by McLachlin J. in the quote that begins this section,
it is quite possible that the real motive for suppressing such expression has less to do
with tranquillity than of stilling criticism of the state for not dealing with the real
problems at hand, i.e. increasing poverty and homelessness. A steady diet of federal
and provincial government cuts to social programs, unemployment insurance, social
housing and job retraining has resulted in increased numbers of panhandlers as well
as higher levels of homelessness and poverty generally. Unfortunately, these problems
have been downloaded to the level of government least able to remedy them; instead,
municipalities try to block them from sight through anti-panhandling legislation. The
Ontario government is most directly implicated in this cycle. Their cuts to welfare and
social programs have helped drive people onto the streets; the Safe Streets Act removes
the results of their actions. The solution proposed by these laws confuses safety with
inconvenience, and does not improve the thinking citizen's tranquillity or quality of
life.
As detailed above, I conclude that the objective of the legislation-to regulate public
nuisance and ensure public tranquillity-is vague, uncompelling and at odds with the
government's responsibility to ensure free expression to all its citizens in public
places, especially expression which is political in effect. As such, it is not "pressing
and substantial" enough to pass the strict standard of review of first stage of the Oakes
test, and should be struck down.
c) Proportionality test
If the purpose of public order were to be found compelling enough to justify infringing
a fundamental freedom, the provision would still have to be examined to see if the
means chosen-i.e. the legislative scheme-are proportional to the objectives. The
proportionality test balances the objective of the by-law with the right in question.
Before examining the provisions in light of the three stages-rational connection,
minimal impairment and salutary versus deleterious effects-it is useful to point out
some of the contextual issues which inform the balancing act undertaken in the
proportionality analysis.
i) Public Property is a Public Trust
American courts focus on the concept of the public forum when dealing with anti-pan-
handling ordinances (see section IV). As such, they consider where the expression
takes place: whether it is in a "traditional" public forum such as streets or parks,
publicly owned property that government "designates" for use wholly or partly for
expressive purposes, or publicly owned property which is held to fulfill other pur-
poses.
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Canadian courts have considered this doctrine, most notably in Commonwealth, a case
which upheld the right of a group to leaflet in airports. After discussion of the public
forum concept, Lamer C.J. wrote:
[I]n the Canadian legal context, it would be preferable to disregard the nominalistic
approach developed by the American courts and instead to balance the interests
underlying the public forum doctrine. The American experience shows that the
"public forum" concept actually results from an attempt to strike a ialance between
the interests of the individual and the interests of the government. As there is no
provision similar to s. 1 of our Charter, the American "public forum" doctrine is the
result of the reconciliation of the individual's interest in expressing himself in a
place which is itself highly propitious to such expression and of the government's
interest in being able to manage effectively the premises that it owns. For example,
parks and public roads which have earned the "public forum" classification are in
fact places whose functions will generally not be interfered with by the exercise of
freedom of expression.64
All of the judges in Commonwealth agreed that the issues set out in the public forum
doctrine were best addressed as part of a section 1 analysis in the Canadian context,
but the three judgments revealed slightly different approaches. Lamer C.J. tended
toward a highly functional approach, balancing the interests of the individual against
the uses made of the state by the property in question. L'Heureux-Dubd J. was the
most protective of the right, finding that freedom of expression would almost always
take precedence on public property unless clearly incompatible with the function of a
place. McLachlin J. (as she then was) asked first whether the individual's activity in
that location furthered the right and balanced the state's interest in limiting expression
on that particular property, and second whether the connection between the physical
location and the expression under consideration related to the values underlying
section 2(b) before finally balancing the rights in question.
Notable in every judgment given in Commonwealth was the expression of the belief
that, as put succinctly by LaForest J.,
[F]reedom does not encompass the right to use any and all government property for
purposes of disseminating one's views on public matters, but I have no doubt that it
does include the right to use for that purpose streets and parks which are dedicated
to the use of the public, subject no doubt to reasonable regulation to ensure their
continued use for the purposes to which they are dedicated.65
A functional approach to public property can go too far, however. Writer Peter Marin
points out that as retail areas ii urban centres become more "mall-like" in physical
form, merchants begin to treat the streets as if they were in fact malls. 66 Thus they
begin to think of these areas as private spaces, easily subject to regulation. Anti-
begging laws play a role in what Marin calls an "urban mercantile campaign against
64. Commonwealth, supra note 36 at 152 [emphasis added].
65. Ibid. at 165-66.
66. The Sparks St. Mall in Ottawa is a perfect example of this phenomenon.
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the homeless." Indeed, he notes that some of the anti-begging ordinances in the U.S.
redefine the public function of the street as economic rather than political. As urban
areas become gentrified, an incipient contest arises for certain territories between
richer and poorer residents, or between businesses and former residents. This conflict
of two worlds dislocates the poor but, notes Marin wryly, also presents great begging
opportunities.
67
Notwithstanding this caution, Canadian courts have followed the functional approach
of Commonwealth, generally ruling that limitations on such expression will only be
allowed when they interfere with the normal operation of a publicly-owned space. For
example, in Peterborough (City) v. Ramsden,68 the court asked whether postering on
public utility poles interfered with their use as utility poles. Unsurprisingly, Iacobucci
J. found that it did not. In a unanimous decision, the court wrote: "posters have
communicated political, cultural and social information for centuries. Postering on
public property including utility poles increases the availability of these messages,
and thereby fosters social and political decision-making." 69 Similarly, in United Food
and Commercial Workers, Local 1518 (U.F.C.W.) v. KMart Canada Ltd.,70 the court
upheld the right of the union to hand out leaflets because such action was not coercive,
did not unduly interfere with the ability of consumers to use the store, and did not
prevent access to the premises by suppliers or other staff workers. As such, leafleting
was not seen as being incompatible with the use of the space and an attempt to limit
such expression was struck down. Wrote Cory J:
The distribution of leaflets and posters is typically less expensive and more readily
available than other forms of expression. As a result, they are particularly important
means of providing information and seeking support by the vulnerable and less
powerful members of society... Leafleting, like the postering at issue in Ramsden,
is a form of expression that has historically been used by vulnerable and disadvan-
taged groups.71
Public places have been used for centuries to disseminate information to those who
gather there in various forms: posters, placards, leaflets, performance, debates and
advertising. Like these kinds of communication, panhandling has historically been a
feature of public space. Panhandling is a basic form of social conduct, as it relies on
person-to-person interaction; and public space, as discussed above, is an historic
forum for such interaction between strangers. Personal contact is the first element of
all communication; advertising of any sort is merely a sophisticated proxy which
allows the communicator to reach more people than a single voice ever could in a
given space of time. As such, panhandling in public places is part and parcel of the
diverse, vital and sometimes chaotic nature of democratic society.
67. Interview with P. Marin, 28 October 1999.
68. [ 1993] 2 S.C.R. 1084, [hereinafter Ramsden].
69. Ibid. at para. 29.
70. [1999] S.C.J. No. 44.
71. Ibid. at para. 28.
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ii) Rights and Obligations of Public Property Ownership
In Commonwealth, Lamer C.J. called the government's relationship to public space a
"quasi-fiduciary" right of ownership. This notion of a trust-like relationship assumes
that governments not only have a responsibility not to unduly restrict freedom of
speech in public spaces, but places a corresponding obligation on them to ensure a
right of access for this purpose as an essential part of a functioning democracy. He
wrote:
The very nature of the relationship existing between citizens and the elected gov-
ernment provides that the latter will own places for the citizens' benefit and use,
unlike a private owner who benefits personally from the places he owns. The
"quasi-fiduciary" nature of the government's right of ownership was indeed clearly
set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion, supra, at pp. 515-16:
'Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public ques-
tions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.'
72
The Charter itself was created in the recognition that rights and liberties of citizens
do not exist in a vacuum, but need to be actively protected by governments and by the
justice system. As such, the notion of a positive obligation on the part of a govern-
ment-i.e. ensuring the right of free speech on publicly owned property-can be seen
as consistent with the purposes of a rights-protecting document, and as inconsistent
with the purposes of the anti-panhandling laws under discussion.
iii) Rational Connection
If one assumes that the objective of the laws is public order in an aesthetic sense, then
the means chosen can be seen as rationally connected on its face. The restoration of
public order, defined by the removal of beggars from the streetscape, may indeed make
people feel safer. However, if public order means the lessening of crime and a safer
environment in a substantive sense, then there is no rational causal connection between
the laws, which are largely aesthetic and psychological in nature, and an objective of
increased public safety. Legislation to combat crime is quite different from legislation
to address distaste. As John Stuart Mill wrote, "[t]he only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others."'73 Furthermore, he wrote:
...with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury
which a person causes to society by conduct which neither violates any specific
duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual
except himself, the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the
sake of the greater good of human freedom. 74
72. Commonwealth, supra note 36 at 154.
73. J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978) at 9.
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The suppression of panhandling may be rationally connected to a goal of less "annoy-
ance" on city streets, but, to go back to the quote of McLachlin J. on page 63, it may
also be politically expedient: it makes people "feel" safer by removing beggars from
the street and removes overt criticism of the government's social policies
iv) Minimal Impairment
The Winnipeg and Vancouver by-laws, as well as Ontario's Safe Streets Act, may
satisfy a minimal impairment test by virtue of their tailored geographical scope, similar
to a time/place/manner restriction used in the United States. The Vancouver "sitting"
provision, however, is less likely to be considered minimally impairing of the right.
Like the former Ottawa by-law, it is overbroad (in Ottawa, all expressions of need by
individuals were prohibited in all public spaces, regardless of whether they were
genuinely "panhandling" or requesting a quarter for an emergency phone call). Such
' legislation has the potential to catch much innocent conduct as well as actual begging.
In addition, only the Ontario legislation makes any attempt to distinguish between
aggressive forms of begging and peaceful begging, and even the Safe Streets Act
appears to lose this distinction once it moves into the prohibition of begging at certain
locations.
One of the questions asked in the minimal impairment analysis is whether other
alternatives of furthering the legislative objective could reasonably be found. If the
objective is construed as furthering public order, it would seem logical that a better-
tailored law would address itself to disorderly, obstructionist or aggressive conduct.
In fact, provisions already exist for many of these offenses under the Criminal Code.
Whether criminal or municipal in form, however, the principle of targeting a narrow
range of actual problems is more appropriate than banning, in advance, speech which
is tenuously connected to such behaviour.
v) Proportionality: Salutary and deleterious effects
The last stage of the Oakes test examines the proportionality of the infringing measure
to the objective as it will be experienced in practice. The refinement made to this stage
in Dagenais requires that the salutary effects of the legislation be compared to its
deleterious effects.
It is hard to justify the concept that improving the aesthetics of a street for the benefit
of the majority truly outweighs the serious subsistence concerns of an underprivileged
minority. As discussed above, the practical implications of this legislation are enor-
mous for panhandlers, and are offset by an objective which really addresses a minor
inconvenience, if any, to other members of the public. It bears repeating that the
salutary effects of the legislation are only salutary for the better-off in our society. The
deleterious effects of the legislation, which are further explored in the section 7
argument, far outweigh the salutary effects which might be gained by restoring a
measure of "tranquillity" on city streets. The dubious pleasure of being able to walk
down a street without being faced by the indigent pales in comparison to the effects
on the population targeted by the by-laws.
74. Ibid. at 80.
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B.Section 7 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice
1. The Scope of the Right
Section 7 is commonly understood to have two distinct parts: the right of life, liberty
and security of the person; and the internal qualifier which allows that right to be
trenched upon only in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
2. Liberty
In Big M, Dickson C.J.C. wrote "[f]reedom can primarily be characterized by the
absence of coercion or constraint... Coercion includes not only such blatant forms of
compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of sanction,
coercion includes indirect forms of control which determine or limit alternative
courses of conduct available to others. '75
As already noted, the prohibitions against panhandling apply in purpose to everyone
without distinction. In effect, however, the by-laws only restrict the liberty interest of
those who panhandle. While the "choice" to panhandle may not be on everyone's list
of economic alternatives, it is a viable subsistence strategy and a valid personal choice
for a significant segment of the poor and/or homeless population. In R. v. Morgentaler,76
Wilson J. wrote that the right to liberty guaranteed individuals autonomy to make
decisions affecting their private lives. The anti-panhandling provisions prohibit such
decisions and, as such, "determine or limit alternative courses of conduct available to
others."77
It could also be argued that panhandling constitutes a livelihood for those who practice
it. Sociologist David Snow suggests that the traditional definition of work is too
narrow: social scientists typically let governments define it because they collect the
data. But governments think of work institutionally, in terms of set wages, places and
time period. Prof. Snow maintains that there is a world of activity, which he calls
"shadow work", devoted to the same ends as "traditional work": they are both
legitimate means through which people attempt to survive. 78 In Wilson v. Medical
Services Commission of British Columbia,79 the court wrote that the right to pursue a
livelihood affects one's dignity and self-worth, and directly implicates the liberty
interest. If panhandling could be seen as a livelihood, then "[t]he effect.. .of the alleged
deprivations ... has far reaching implications. '8 0
75. R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 336 [hereinafter Big MI.
76. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 [hereinafter Morgentaler].
77. Big M, supra note 75.
78. Interview with Prof. D. Snow, 2 November 1999. "Shadow work" could include, for example,
dumpster diving, selling one's blood (in the U.S.), collecting bottles, etc.
79. Wilson v. Medical Services Commission of British Columbia (1989), 53 D.L.R. (4th).
80. Ibid. at 188.
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3. Security of the Person
In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.),81 Chief
Justice Lamer wrote that the Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that
security of the person includes both physical and psychological integrity. He also
concluded that security of the person can extend beyond the context of the criminal
justice system: "...s.7 is not limited solely to purely criminal or penal matters. There
are other ways in which the government, in the course of the administration of justice,
can deprive a person of the s.7 rights to liberty and security of the person.18 2
The anti-panhandling by-laws infringe the physical security of those affected clearly
and simply: they deprive panhandlers of what may in some cases be their only means
of subsistence. Even if a panhandler collects a minimal amount of social assistance,
panhandling may be the means by which this amount is "topped up" to allow him to
meet his physical needs. The law acts to potentially deprive panhandlers of the ability
to meet these needs at the most basic level: food, clothing and shelter. As such, the
deprivation of security of the person could also infringe the right to life. As the
Supreme Court wrote in Morgentaler, "The law has long recognized that the human
body ought to be protected from interference by others."8 3 More specifically in this
case, it is the state's interference that infringes the right, since-ironically-it is the
"requested interference" of the passer-by which protects the physical subsistence of
the panhandler.84
The deprivation of physical security of the person also triggers the right of psycho-
logical security of the person. By depriving a panhandler of his means of sustenance,
a level of stress and desperation results which has "a serious and profound effect" on
his psychological integrity.
In J(G), Chief Justice Lamer opened an intriguing door to the relationship between
sections 2 and 7. In his discussion of psychological stress, he noted that:
[T]he right to security of the person does not protect the individual from the ordi-
nary stresses and anxieties that a person of reasonable sensibility would suffer as a
result of government action....Nor will every violation of a fundamental freedom
guaranteed in s. 2 of the Charter amount to a restriction of security of the person. I
do not believe it can be seriously argued that a law prohibiting certain kinds of
commercial expression in violation of s. 2(b), for example, will necessarily result in
a violation of the psychological integrity of the person. This is not to say, though,
81. [ 1999] S.C.J. No. 47 [hereinafter J(G)].
82. Ibida at para. 58.
83. Morgentaler, supra note 76 at 908.
84. Joe Hermer suggests that "begging can be understood as a 'gift encounter'...a historically specific
and particular form of social relationship which governs the ways in which strangers can express
compassion and provide assistance to one another in public space... Public space gift encounters
constitute not only a form of communication, but a form of essential social interaction, the prohibi-
tion of which constitutes a breach of the maintenance of security of the person." Letter to D. Graser,
28 November 1999.
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that there will never be cases where a violation of s. 2 will also deprive an individ-
ual of security of the person. 85
In other words, there are potential situations where a violation of section 2 may result
in a deprivation of security of the person. This requires a high threshold: a prohibition
against making child pornography, against hate speech, or against expressing religious
views in certain situations could be said to infringe a person's psychological integrity
where he passionately believes in his views and wishes to communicate them to the
public (no matter how distasteful they may be to others). This does not apply, of course,
to situations where speech causes actual harm to other people, but laws already exist
to address such situations. Panhandling is a perfect example of the Chief Justice's
theory: not being able to express one's need causes psychological stress of the severest
nature. Further, it affects physical security of the person both because a beggar is
prevented from making enough money to eat or find shelter, and because he may be
subject to police harassment and potential incarceration.
4. Principles of Fundamental Justice
The principles of fundamental justice are found in the "basic tenets of our legal
system" and commonly refer to the individual's interaction with the criminal justice
system. In B(R) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,86 Lamer C.J.C.
broadened the notions of the principles of fundamental justice to deal not just with
criminal proceedings but with state action in general: "...the subject matter of s.7 must
be the conduct of the state when the state.. .invokes the law to deprive a person of
liberty through judges, magistrates, ministers, board members, etc."
87
The principles of fundamental justice have two aspects: procedural and substantive.
Procedurally, the notion of the rule of law is central. If the state is going to infringe
an individual's rights, it must not act in an arbitrary or unfair fashion.
An examination of the by-laws reveal no procedural arbitrariness. In Ottawa, the
penalty is a fine of not more than $5000; in Vancouver, it is a fine of up to $2000; in
Winnipeg it is a fine of up to $1000, or possibly a jail term of up to six months. In
Ontario, a first conviction carries a fine of up to $500; subsequent convictions are
either a fine of up to $1000 or a prison term of up to six months.
While the basic procedures surrounding the regulations of panhandling do not offend
the principles of fundamental justice, the substantive question of "fairness" is worth
more thought. Is it "fair" that a "charity" can collect donations for the needy, while
the needy themselves are prohibited from doing so? Is the law prohibiting the conduct
of asking, or the visual disturbance of being faced with a person in distress? If the law
prohibits the conduct of soliciting donations, it seems both arbitrary and unfair that
those who are most needy are penalized, while charities whose funds may go to the
needy but which may also go to salaries, office space and marketing brochures, are
85. J(G), supra note 81 at para. 59.
86. [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, [hereinafterB(R)].
87. Ibid at 340; see also Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (BC), [1 985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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not. I am not arguing against the validity of institutionalized charities, nor am I
suggesting that they should also be prohibited from soliciting donations: charities play
a vital role in our society. I simply point out the inherent arbitrariness of the legislation:
it supports abstract need but recoils from the specific.
The effects of this legislation from a substantive point of view fail to meet the
principles of fundamental justice in two other aspects. First, the penalty is grossly
disproportionate to the crime: it can be probably be assumed that a panhandler with
$2000 to spend on a fine doesn't exist. Second, the by-laws are arguably overbroad.
At what point do you distinguish someone who is soliciting alms from someone in an
emergency situation who asks a bystander for a quarter to make a phone call? Can a
panhandler who turns a pirouette every time he gets a quarter be deemed a street
performer and thus be exempt? If someone is sitting on the sidewalk with a sign that
says "looking for work" and his baseball cap is overturned beside him, is he begging?
There is no bright line which distinguishes innocent from prohibited conduct under
these by-laws. As such, they give the police highly discretionary powers. The role of
the police is to enforce the law, not to interpret it: the role of government is to create
laws that can be enforced clearly and fairly. Constitutional values and the rule of law
demand no less.
88
C. Section 15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability.
Section 15 of the Charter reflects the constitutional values which provide equal
opportunity to all citizens to participate in society, and reinforce respect for minority
groups. The concepts of substantive equality and human dignity inform all of the other
Charter rights. The Supreme Court has struggled since the inception of the Charter
with the questions of how to define equality, differential treatment and discrimination.
The approach has been continually redefined, as in, for example, the landmark case
of Vriend89 in which the court ruled that not only government action, but government
inaction, could be the basis for finding discrimination under the Charter.90
The Supreme Court brought its equality jurisprudence together last spring when it
ruled on Law v. Canada.91 This case, which dealt with the question of whether the
denial of survivors' benefits to those under 35 years old constituted discrimination,
88. As no case which has found a breach of the principles of fundamental justice has ever survived a
section 1 analysis, I shall spare the reader the exercise.
89. Vriend v. Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter Vriend].
90. In Vriend, the plaintiff was fired from a religious college after he disclosed he was gay. When he
sought to challenge his firing, he discovered that Alberta's Individual Rights Protection Act (IRPA)
did not list sexual orientation as a grounds for discrimination. He successfully challenged this
omission as being discriminatory under the Charter.
91. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [hereinafter Law].
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gave the court an opportunity to set out clear guidelines for the analysis of section 15
claims.
The Law approach asks the court to consider three questions, keeping in mind a
purposive and contextual approach to the analysis:
1. Does the law impose differential treatment, in purpose or effect, between the
claimants and others?
2. Are one or more enumerated or analogous grounds of discrimination the basis
for the differential treatment?
3. Does the law in question have a purpose or effect that is discriminatory within
the meaning of the equality guarantee?
92
1. Differential Treatment
The law draws a distinction between those who "beg or receive alms" and those who
do not. Ostensibly, it draws a distinction based on an action-those who beg-rather
than on a personal characteristic-poverty. In operation and impact, however, it is
clear that few people will be soliciting alms unless they are poor. The question thus
becomes whether poverty can be considered a personal characteristic, i.e. whether
poverty is analogous to the other grounds specified in section 15.
In Andrews v. Law Society of B.C.,93 Wilson J. wrote that a ground could qualify as
analogous if the people characterized by the trait in question are, among other things,
"lacking in political power", "vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their
rights to equal concern and respect violated" and "vulnerable to becoming a disadvan-
taged group", and furthermore noted that "this is a determination which is not to be
made only in the context of the law which is subject to challenge but rather in the
context of the place of the group in the entire social, political and legal fabric of our
society." 94
In Masse v. Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services),95 the Ontario Court
of Appeal concluded that the Ontario government's reduction in the level of social
assistance did not create a distinction "as a result of a differential effect" between
social assistance recipients and others. The court felt that the rise in unemployment,
climate of fiscal austerity, political commitment to reducing the deficit and the impact
of the recession had submitted many different sectors of the population to hardship
and accepted the government's assertion that the cuts to social assistance recipients
were part of a broad-based program of cuts to all sectors, as opposed to selecting a
specific group to bear hardship. 96 Corbett J. particularly noted that it was difficult to
separate social assistance recipients from other low income Canadians. While not
92. Ibid. at para. 89.
93. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafter Andrews].
94. Ibid. at 152.
95. (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4') 20.
96. Ibid.
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finding differentiation on the basis of personal characteristics of social assistance
recipients as a group in this case, the judge wrote: "[i]n another context, social
assistance recipients may well constitute an analogous group or a discrete and insular
minority, as a historically vulnerable, disadvantaged, and marginalized group. ' 97
In these cases, however, the by-laws do not affect many sectors of society: they are
aimed at those who beg. The laws have an unfair impact on a distinct segment of the
population. Throughout history up to the present day, it can be generally be said that
while all the poor do not beg, all beggars are poor. As such, the broader implication
of this legislation is that the state is criminalizing the most visible aspect of poverty.
There is a wealth of evidence that shows the poor already suffer a disadvantaged
position within Canadian society, from sheer economic hardship, to social perceptions
of the poor, to underrepresentation in the democratic political process, both as voters
and candidates. 98 The legislation reinforces society's disapprobation of the poor,
rather than ameliorating it in furtherance of the equality guarantees under section
15(1).
2. Distinction on the basis of enumerated or analogous grounds
Poverty and homelessness affect a wide range of people: single mothers with children,
the elderly and the disabled, to name but a few. Indeed, poor people are often members
of groups already recognized under section 15 as tending to suffer discrimination. Yet,
to dismiss the poor as not being an analogous ground because so many of them are
already covered under other enumerated areas is to miss the point. In Vriend, the
Attorney-General of Alberta tried to argue that Delwin Vriend, a homosexual, was
covered by the Individual Rights Protection Act under other headings: for example,
the government lawyer argued famously in his oral submission, should Vriend contract
AIDS, he would be covered by the disability provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court
rightly pointed out that the purpose of the equality provision was to protect citizens
from discrimination on the precise grounds upon which such discrimination occurred.
To argue that Vriend could seek recourse under other provisions but not on the grounds
of sexual orientation was to force him to deny the very characteristic for which he
sought redress. Chief Justice Lamer noted that the general purpose of the Act-to
protect citizens from discrimination-was not limited to only those grounds enumer-
ated in section 15(1); the categories of discrimination are not closed. 99
A rights-based society which seeks to promote equality and tolerance must be vigilant.
Courts have a duty to ensure that the guarantee of equal protection extends not simply
to those whom society deems "worthy" of respect and consideration, but to those
97. Ibid. at para. 52
98. See, e.g.: Ontario Social Safety NetWork "Ontario Welfare Rate Cuts: An Anniversary Report"
(October 1996) [hereinafter "Ontario Welfare"), 'Taking Responsibility for Homelessness: An
Action Plan for Toronto" (Overview and Recommendations); Mayor's Homelessness Action Task
Force (January 1999) and A. Schafer, "Down and Out in Winnipeg and Toronto: The Ethics of
Legislating Against Panhandling" (August 1998) unpublished, archived at Centre for Professional
and Applied Ethics, University of Manitoba.
99. From oral argument made by John McCarthy to the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend supra note 87.
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whose dignity is genuinely impugned by state action. Laws which prohibit panhan-
dling purport to do so in the name of public order or, as the Ottawa by-law states, "to
provide for an environment free from certain public nuisances which may degrade the
quality and tranquillity of life." Translated, this means: panhandlers are a nuisance
because they remind those who are better off of our society's failure to care for its
most needy. Hence, rather than addressing the root cause of the problem-the lack of
state support and resources dedicated to helping the poor out of their poverty-these
by-laws address only the visual manifestation of poverty. In removing the constant,
daily reminders of poverty without addressing its root, the state becomes a conspirator
in the act of discrimination.
3. Contextual Factors: Historic Disadvantage
In Law, Iacobucci J. wrote "... probably the most compelling factor favouring a
conclusion that differential treatment imposed by legislation is truly discriminatory
will be, where it exists, pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping, or
prejudice experienced by the individual or group."' 00
The criminalization of poverty, homelessness and begging have been part of the social
fabric for centuries. In Regulating the Poor,101 Frances Fox Piven and Richard
Cloward trace the history of beggars and the western relief system from feudal times:
Even before the sixteenth century, the magistrates of Basel had defined twenty-five
different categories of beggars, together with appropriate punishment for each. But
penalties alone did not deter begging, especially when economic distress was severe
and the numbers affected were large. Consequently, some localities began to aug-
ment punishment with provisions for the relief of the vagrant poor. 10 2
In 1534, the town of Lyons, France, dealt with an increasing number of beggars by
instituting state aid in the form of the "Aumone-G6nfrale," whose mandate was to
"nourish the poor forever." Write Piven and Cloward "...most of the features of
modem welfare-from criteria to discriminate the worthy poor from the unworthy to
strict procedures for surveillance of recipients and measures for their rehabilitation-
were present in Lyons' new relief administration." 103 At almost exactly the same time
in England, the government replaced what had been up to that point local parish
schemes of charity with a national relief system. "In 153 1, an act of Parliament decreed
that local officials search out and register those of the destitute deemed to be impotent,
and give them a document authorizing begging. Almsgiving to others was outlawed.
As for those who sought alms without authorization, the penalty was public whipping
till the blood ran." 104 But by the late 1500s, beggary had increased: hence the
institution of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, which brought in a tax to finance the care of
paupers and placed justices of the peace in the position of supervising the poor. The
100. Law, supra note 89 at para. 63.
101. Fox Piven and Cloward, supra note 1.
102. Ibid. at 8.
103. Ibid. at 11.
104. Ibid. at 15
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institutions of workhouses and relief which followed were designed to be so harsh that
no one with any conceivable alternative would turn to them:
The workhouse was designed to spur men to contrive ways of supporting them-
selves by their own industry, to offer themselves to any employer on any terms. It
did this by making pariahs of those who could not support themselves; they served
as an object lesson, a means of celebrating the virtues of work by the terrible
example of their agony. Three years after the Poor Law Commissioners of 1834
decreed the abolition of outdoor relief and the expansion of the system of work-
houses, Disraeli accurately said of this reform that 'it announces to the world that in
England poverty is a crime."1 05
Canada moved from a primarily agrarian society in the late nineteenth century to an
industrialized nation in the early years of the twentieth century. As in England, this
spawned considerable economic instability, causing social reformers to press for a
system of social security. Martha Jackman discusses this phenomenon in her article
"The Protection of Welfare Rights": 106
Leacock described the progressive rejection of nineteenth century individualism-
the doctrine 'every man for himself' - and the awakening sense in Canadians of the
collective responsibility of society towards its weaker members ... In response ...
the federal and provincial governments began, during and after the first world war,
to enact workmen's compensation acts, minimum wage legislation, mothers' allow-
ances and old age pension legislation. 107
Between the mid-1940s and the end of the 1950s, legislation was brought in to deal
with regional disparities in the form of equalization payments, Canada's first unem-
ployment insurance act, family allowances, retirement and disability pensions, old age
security and cost-sharing of hospital insurance programs.108 In 1966-67, the Canada
Assistance Plan consolidated existing federal-provincial social assistance programs.
Wrote Jackman:
For the first time, social security benefits were extended to the working poor...
[but] In the late 1960's, after two decades of steady economic growth, intense
public attention was focused on the problem of the continued existence of serious
poverty in Canada... The 1971 report of the Special Senate Committee on Pov-
erty... emphasized the structural causes of poverty in Canada, and the disproportion-
ate impact of poverty on women, racial minorities and native people.10 9
After several years of expansion of relief programs by both levels of government,
cutbacks began taking place in the mid 1970s in response to high unemployment, rising
inflation and the energy crisis.110
105. Ibid. at 17 [emphasis in original].
106. M. Jackman, "The Protection of Welfare Rights Under the Charter," (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 257.
107. Ibid. at 270.
108. Ibid. at 273.
109. Ibid. at 274.
110. Ibid. at 275.
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In a 1998 report to the City of Toronto Homelessness Task Force titled "Trends in
Poverty in the New City of Toronto," Il l the authors note that despite the economic
recovery of the mid-1990s, poverty in Canada has continued to increase. This trend is
reflected internationally, particularly in the United Kingdom, the U.S., Australia and
New Zealand. The authors quote the Organization for Economic Development and
Co-operation as attributing this phenomenon to three main factors: structural eco-
nomic change ('deindustrialization'); changing patterns of international trade; and
technological change which reduces the demand for low skill labour.'1 2 While noting
that Canada has done a better job than most of these other countries in keeping pace
with market income inequality through social assistance, they note:
There is a worrying tic upward in inequality over the last two years. This coincides
with substantial reductions in transfer payments at both the federal and provincial
levels... Although detailed data on Ontario is not yet available, it can be safely
assumed that the province's overall patterns of poverty are similar to those we have
seen for Canada. This means that the underlying trend in Ontario is to a much
higher inequality of market income, with lower incomes for the poorest families and
an increasing incidence and depth of poverty, partially disguised for the time being
by the economic boom cycle. The consequences for the prevalence of poverty in the
next economic downturn, which will with certainty come at some time, could be
severe. Policy responses to address the issues of poverty or homelessness should
therefore take account of this underlying reality. 
113
In the fall of 1995, the Ontario government cut welfare allowances by 21.6% and
tightened eligibility rules. The proportion of adult food bank users who missed meals
on a daily basis becadse they could not afford food rose from 15% in 1995 to 35% in
1996.114
The number of children who lived in families needing food bank assistance increased
by 65% to 71,000.115 The de-institutionalization of psychiatric patients without a
corresponding community social safety net means they now form an estimated 11%
of the homeless population. 116 Official unemployment rates in Ontario are currently
about 7%. 117 Wrote the Ontario Social Safety Network "Many people can no longer
afford transportation to look for work or go to training courses... do not even have
money to buy stamps, print resumes or buy newspapers to check job ads... In one
training program for welfare recipients, half the participants had to leave classes
during a month to get to a local food bank during its operating hours."
' 118
111. M. Mendelson, A. Mitchell & M. Swayze, "Trends in Poverty in the New City of Toronto" - report
to Mayor's Homelessness Action Task Force (July 1998).
112. Ibid. at 8.
113. Ibid. at 11.
114. Supra note 98 at 10.
115. Ibid.
116. M. Philp "Idea of Mentally Ill Homeless in Doubt" The Globe and Mail (04 Nov. 1997), challenging
an earlier estimate that 30% of the homeless population were mentally ill.
117. Statistics Canada as reported in "Statistical Trends" The Globe and Mail (13 Dec. 1999)
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The rise of poverty and the visible number of homelessness on the streets have given
rise to what Prof. David Hulchanski of the University of Toronto calls a "moral
panic." 119 People feel threatened by the increasing numbers of homeless people,
squeegee kids and beggars on the streets, and fall back on stereotyping homeless
people as lazy, undeserving and unworthy of support. This attitude is reinforced by
continuing government cutbacks. In the fall of 1999, the Ontario government intro-
duced yet more cuts to the system, including:
- $75-million cut. Purpose: Continuing to reduce welfare rolls
- $25-million cut. Purpose: Streamlining the welfare system
- $8-million cut. Purpose: Helping welfare recipients pursue spousal support. 120
Implicit in these cuts is an attitude that by "streamlining" welfare (translation: kicking
people off), the lazy will become industrious, find jobs or sell their cottages in the
country. As The Globe and Mail reported:
A crackdown on welfare fraud is projected to save $3-million a year. Included in
this is a requirement that individuals with second residences, such as cottages, sell
them before becoming eligible for welfare. This new regulation has drawn consider-
able attention, although the Social Services Ministry says there are only 20 such
cases in the province and the resulting savings will total about $200,000 a year.121
This gives rise to a peculiar situation. Stereotypes notwithstanding, I think it can fairly
be said that most Canadians are worried about homelessness and poverty. At the same
time, the state is cutting benefits-which will result in more poverty, not less by any
common sense analysis-and then criminalizing the results of its action by introducing
anti-panhandling legislation. 122 In everyday parlance, this is called punishing the
victim. In equality discourse, it can be seen as compounding the historic disadvantage
faced by the poor and demonizing them as being unworthy of support. As Justice
Iacobucci wrote in Law of groups suffering from pre-existing disadvantage, "It is
logical to conclude that, in most cases, further differential treatment will contribute to
the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair social characterization, and will have a
more severe impact upon them, since they are already vulnerable.' 123 His words ring
118. Ibid.atp. 15.
119. Interview with Prof. D. Hulchanski, 29 October 1999. For more information about the notion of
"moral panic", see S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers
(London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1972) and S. Hall, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law
and Order (London: Macmillan Press, 1978).
120. R. Mackie, "Ontario puts squeeze on welfare" The Globe and Mail (19 November 1999).
121. Ibid.
122. This is further complicated by the fact that reductions in transfer payments from the federal govern-
ment result in budget-cutting measures by the provincial government, which result in downloading to
municipalities, who cope with the results of welfare cutbacks by trying to legislate panhandlers out
of sight. The complexity of this interaction makes it difficult to pin this on "the state" as a singular
entity.
123. Law, supra note 89 at para. 63.
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true in this context. Recognition of the poor and the homeless as an analogous group
entitled to equal protection of the law would recognize that even the most destitute
among us are human beings, worthy of dignity, concern and respect.
4. Discrimination
Do municipal by-laws which criminalize panhandling constitute discrimination under
section 15? The purpose of the panhandling by-laws generally consist of eradicating
public "nuisances." The purpose of section 15(1) is to "prevent the violation of
essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereo-
typing, or political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons
enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society,
equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration."' 124
On its face, the purpose of the by-law is not necessarily in conflict with section 15(1).
To paraphrase Anatole France, the rich and the poor are equally prohibited from
panhandling. As shown above, however, the social and political context of these laws
makes their effect discriminatory. Anti-panhandling laws express a society's disap-
probation of the poor, its rejection of their expression of need, and reinforce stereo-
types of the poor as unworthy of "concern, respect and consideration."' 125 The
reasonable person would agree that panhandling laws, in effect, penalize only the poor.
It is extremely localized legislation aimed at a specific and easily identifiable group:
those who dare ask for help.
The most important value underlying the section 15 right, and the value that the
equality guarantee lends to all Charter rights, is that of human dignity. In Law,
Iacobucci J. wrote:
Human dignity ... is concerned with physical and psychological integrity and
empowerment. Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised upon
personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs, capacities
or merits ... Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are
marginalized, ignored or devalued ... Human dignity within the meaning of the
equality guarantee does not relate to the status or position of an individual in society
per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a person legitimately feels when
confronted with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into
account all of the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by
the law? 126
John Stuart Mill wrote "For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties
is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective.. *"127
We don't like to look at a beggar because he reminds us of what we could become.
Thus, we punish him for the crime of being poor; we deny him individuality by
124. Ibid. at para. 51.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid. atpara. 53.
127. Mill, supra note 73 at 30.
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condemning beggars en masse, without regard to circumstances or personalities; and
we deny him dignity by treating him as less than human, in order to further distance
him from our perception of ourselves. Such a law is not only discriminatory, but
indulges the smallest part of our natures: that which is beset by fear and intolerance
of difference.
IV. AMERICAN CASE LAW
A number of cases dealing with various forms of anti-panhandling ordinances and
related by-laws have been litigated over the past decade in the United States. Such
laws have been challenged on grounds varying from violations of the First Amendment
(freedom of speech) to the Fourth Amendment (protection against unreasonable search
and seizure), the Fifth Amendment (deprivation of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law), the Eight Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) and the
Fourteenth Amendment (no law can "abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens"). In addition, by-laws have been struck down for violating the right to travel,
128
because they are too vague to be precisely understood by a person of ordinary
intelligence, or because they are overly broad in their scope, catching innocent activity
as well as impugned conduct.
A. The First Amendment
29
While the First Amendment, which states "Congress shall make no law.. .abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press," sounds very similar to the language used in
section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the two differ consid-
erably from an interpretive standpoint. While Canadian courts count virtually all forms
of expression as lying within the scope of the guarantee, 130 courts in the United States
have been far less generous. 131 Three major differences in approach are notable in
discussing anti-panhandling ordinances.
1) Speech versus Conduct
First, American courts distinguish between speech and conduct. In Canadian jurispru-
dence, if activity conveys a meaning-whether central or otherwise-it is considered
to be within the scope of protection of the guarantee of freedom of expression, as long
128. 'The ... right to travel ... finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been
suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concom-
itant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution.' United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757-758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966).
129. For a comprehensive discussion of begging and the First Amendment, see "Compassion Fatigue,"
supra note 7.
130. See discussion of the Irwin Toy test, infra at 56.
131. While almost any expression considered to be political in nature has been safeguarded, the American
courts have, over the years, expanded protection in some areas (advertising, corporate expression,
and boycotting) while cutting back protection in others (picketing, free speech rights of government
employees, privately owned public areas, etc.) See L.H. Tribe, Constitutional Choices (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1985) at 192.
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as it is not violent. 132 In the United States, however [m]ere conduct is not expressive,
and legislation may restrict it. But if the conduct is expressive and central to the actor's
message, a law restricting that conduct is subject to a free expression challenge."' 133
Thus, a Seattle ordinance which prohibited sitting or lying on sidewalks in downtown
or other commercial zones between 7 AM and 9 PM was not held to violate freedom
of expression because sitting was not deemed expressive conduct-regardless of the
fact that one of the plaintiffs was sitting with a lap full of pamphlets protesting the
by-law under challenge.
2) The Public Forum
The second major point of distinction is the concept of the public forum. In his seminal
1965 article "The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana," Prof. Harry
Kalven, Jr. wrote: "in an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other
public places are an important facility for public discussion and political process. They
are in brief a public forum that the citizen can commandeer; the generosity and
empathy with which such facilities are made available is an index of freedom."' 1
34
The public forum doctrine suggests that certain areas owned by the government are
traditional platforms for public expression and should remain so. For First Amendment
purposes,'public property is typically divided into three categories: traditional public
fora (typically sidewalks, streets and parks); designated public fora, where the gov-
ernment has specifically allowed a property to be used for public access and expressive
activity (such as a community centre or university); and all other public property, such
as metropolitan airports and subway systems. 135 A stringent standard of review is
applied to restrictions of expression in traditional public fora. As long as the designated
public fora retains an open character, it is equally bound to the same standards; but,
as long as speech is not restricted on the basis of content, a restriction need only be
reasonable to pass muster in the third category. 136 While the public forum doctrine has
come under fire from academic commentators in recent years, it nonetheless continues to
form an integral part of the analysis in American caselaw dealing with anti-panhandling
ordinances. 1
37
132. Irwin Toy, supra note 21 at 970.
133. City of Seattle v. McConahy 86 Wash.App 557 (1997) at 567. See also the two-stage test from
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 410-11, which holds that in order to be expression, the speaker
must intend the conduct to convey a particular message and there must be a strong likelihood that the
audience can understand it.
134. [1965] Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, at 11-12.
135. See Doucette v. City of Santa Monica 955 F. supp 1192 (1997) paras. 17-22.
136. Ibid. quoting the Supreme Court, at para. 22.
137. In addition to the cases discussed here, see also International Society For Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992), [hereinafter ISKCON] and Perry EL Assn. v. Perry
Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 103 S.Ct. 948,74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).
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3) Time/Place/Manner Restrictions
The final major distinction between American and Canadian jurisprudence is the
time/place/manner restriction, which is somewhat similar to the Oakes test used under
the Canadian Charter. As in Oakes, the court looks at the purpose of the ordinance,
the objective of the government in enacting it, and whether the government has
restricted the constitutional right as minimally as possible in meeting its objective.
Two tests come into play, as summarized by the New York District Court in Loper:.
The O'Brien test is normally used to analyze government regulation of conduct that
may have an expressive element. Under O'Brien, a government regulation is suffi-
ciently justified when: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmen-
tal interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest...
Merging with O'Brien is the standard used to assess time, place, and manner
restrictions on "pure speech" in traditional public fora... Such restrictions are valid
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the. regulated
speech.. .are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. 138
a) Is begging "speech"for the purposes of the First Amendment?
The "threshold" question is one of content: strict scrutiny will be given to a regulation
which aims at suppressing the content of speech, where a more relaxed standard will
be given to one which is content-neutral in its purpose. Thus, how speech is charac-
terized becomes the first part of the test, and can determine the outcome of the case.
For example, in Young v. New York City Transit Authority,139 the Court of Appeal
upheld a prohibition on individual begging in the subway system, even though the
Authority allowed some charitable organizations to solicit on their property. Said the
court:
The real issue here is whether begging constitutes the kind of "expressive conduct"
protected to some extent by the First Amendment... It seems fair to say that most
individuals who beg are not doing so to convey any social or political message.
Rather, they beg to collect money. Arguably, any given beggar may have "[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message," e.g.: "Government benefits are inade-
quate;" "I am homeless;" or "There is a living to be made in panhandling." ... The
only message that we are able to espy as common to all acts of begging is that
beggars want to exact money from those whom they accost. While we acknowledge
that passengers generally understand this generic message, we think it falls far
outside the scope of protected speech under the First Amendment. 140
Because the Young court felt that begging was not communicative in character, they
applied a more relaxed standard to the regulation and upheld the ordinance. 141 In doing
138. Supra note 5 at 1039.
139. 903 F.2d 146 (1990).
140. Ibid. at 153-154.
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so, however, they disagreed with the prevailing interpretation of three Supreme Court
cases known as the "Schaumburg Trilogy," each of which had ruled in different
contexts that "the nexus between solicitation and the communication of information
and advocacy of causes ... implicates interests protected by the First Amendment.
142
(Indeed, in International Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (ISKCON 1), 143 a case about
a religious order begging in airports, Rehnquist J. for the Supreme Court noted as if
in passing that "It is uncontested that the solicitation at issue in this case is a form of
speech protected under the First Amendment."'1) The Young court saw a clear
distinction between solicitation by beggars and solicitation by charities. However,
other rulings note that the conduct itself is indistinguishable: at issue is its source. The
court in Loper pointed out "[i]f the solicitor is an organized charity, the solicitation is
permitted. If the solicitor is a beggar, the solicitation is criminal."'
145
Courts which have considered begging to be indistinguishable from charitable solic-
itation argue that the content of begging is important speech. As noted by the Loper
court,
The beggar's personal message.. .contains a broader social message even when it is
not explicitly presented to his audience. This is the flip-side of the "Broken Win-
dows" message ... that social and economic conditions and opportunities and gov-
ernmental services are such that many people are unable to support themselves and
must rely on the freely given alms of others in order to eke out an existence while
living on the streets of New York. This too is a critical message that the beggar has
a genuine and legitimate interest in presenting to the public.
146
In Blair v. Shanahan,147 the District Court also made a point of expressly dissenting
from the Young decision:
Young's emphasis on the beggar's motivation seems singularly misplaced in light of
the recent Supreme Court cases giving professional fund raisers full First Amend-
ment protection. ... [The] fund raiser may present a clearer message to his listener
141. In addition to their finding that the law was content-neutral, they also decided that subway cars were
not public fora which again allowed a more relaxed application of the O'Brien test.
142. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3447 (1985) as quoted in
Young, supra note 12. See also Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 104
S.Ct. 2839 (1984) (waiving a requirement that less than 25% of a charity's contributions be used to
finance fundraising activities); Riley v. National Federation of The Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,
108 S.Ct. 2667 (1988) (striking down a regulation stipulating a maximum amount a fundraiser could
charge for his services); and Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens For a Better Environment et al, 100 S.Ct.
1668 (1980) (regulation denying charities a solicitation permit if less than 75% of their contributions went
to charitable causes was held invalid). These Supreme Court cases held that solicitations by charities,
canvassers, and fundraisers were types of speech protected by the First Amendment.
143. ISKCON, supra note 135.
144. Ibid. at 677
145. Loper, supra note 5 at 1040.
146. Ibid. at 1042.
147. 775 F.Supp. 1315 (1991) [hereinafter Blair].
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than the beggar does. But First Amendment protection should not be limited to the
articulate. This Court finds that begging constitutes protected speech. 1
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b) Alternate channels of communication
Key to the time/place/manner analysis is the question of whether alternative channels
for communications are open, and this tends to be the ostensible point on which most
decisions about panhandling ordinances turn. In Young, supra, the subway system was
not considered to be a designated public forum, partly because the "audience" was
unable to escape the solicitation. Additionally, however, the regulation was upheld as
being a reasonable time/place/manner restriction because many other locations existed
where beggars could solicit freely. Similarly, the court in McFarlin v. District of
Columbia149 upheld a restriction on begging within 15 feet of a subway escalator top
as being narrowly tailored to meet an objective of public safety. In Smith v. City of
Fort Lauderdale,150 the court found that a prohibition of begging on a five-mile strip
of beach frequented by tourists was not unreasonably restrictive as alternative oppor-
tunities existed in the rest of the city. In United States v. Kokinda,151 the Supreme
Court ruled that a post office sidewalk was not a public forum, but that even if it was,
the prohibition on soliciting was a reasonable exercise of the time/place/manner
distinction 152 because other forms of speech, picketing and leafleting were not pro-
hibited-simply the request for funds-and plenty of alternative channels for com-
munication remained available, including a municipal sidewalk nearby. 153 Similarly,
in ISKONI, the Supreme Court banned begging by a religious order in airports because
they were not seen as public fora, but took into account the fact that they could beg
without impediment on the sidewalk outside the terminal, where almost all travellers
would enter or exit. 15 4
c) "Blanket" bans of panhandling
Unlike such specifically tailored ordinances, "blanket" bans on begging do not usually
survive First Amendment analysis. In Blair v. Shanahan,155 banning begging in "any
public place" left panhandlers virtually no alternative places to communicate and was
thus struck down. The Loper court, dealing with a class action by the homeless
(challenging a New York Penal Law which made a person guilty of loitering when
148. Ibid. at 1323-24.
149. 681 A.2d 440 (1996).
150. 177 F.3d 954 (1999).
151. 497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (1990).
152. It should be noted, however, that this was a 5-4 decision with a strong dissent on the public forum
issue written by Justice Brennan.
153. In his dissent, Brennan J. noted with irony that although solicitation was banned as being too
obtrusive, large political gatherings attracting thousands of people to the same space were perfectly
permissible.
154. ISKCON, supra note 137 at 2708-09. In ISKCONII and 111, 112 S. Ct. 2709, 2715, the Court struck
down the companion ban on distributing literature in the airport, as this was not seen as incompatible
with the functional operation of the terminal in the way that in-person solicitation might be.
155. Blair, supra note 147.
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begging in a public place), similarly found a blanket ban untenable. 156 A preliminary
injunction was granted to the plaintiffs in Berkeley Community Health Project v. City
of Berkeley157 because the court adjudged there was a substantial likelihood that the
ordinance banning solicitation in certain locations would be shown to be both over-
broad and invalid on its face as restricting the content of speech (the parties eventually
settled, and the City withdrew the ordinance). Alternatives are seen as important in
this context because the poor and homeless lack the financial resources to participate
fully in political and social life, and solicitation is their primary method of communi-
cation with others. Banning begging outright "deprives beggars of the opportunity to
deliver their message, and... deprives some beggars of their only chance for sur-
vival." 158
Finally, as Nancy Millich notes, blanket bans can in some cases be seen as "prior
restraints" on expression, which allow governments to forbid expression before it even
takes place.
Ordinances banning begging are nearly identical to classic prior restraints by judi-
cial injunction, because [they] are a priori determinations by the government that
factual information should not be disseminated.. .A blanket ban on begging authorizes
governmental suppression of beggars' speech before its expression.. .and would
constitute 'the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
Rights.'1 59
B. Other constitutional rights implicated in anti-panhandling ordinances
American courts have struck down ordinances which are supposedly directed at other
forms of conduct, or which include begging as part of a larger category, generally
homelessness. After having made several unsuccessful attempts at legislating begging
and homelessness (all of which were struck down in the courts), the city of Santa Ana,
California enacted a municipal "camping ordinance" which prohibited "camping" and
storing personal property in public places.160 The Santa Ana police raided the personal
possessions of homeless people on several occasions and made no secret about its
desire to drum the homeless out of town. In a challenge to the ordinance, a clearly
exasperated state appeal court found the by-law "constitutionally repugnant" on three
separate grounds: the right to travel, cruel and unusual punishment, vagueness and
overbreadth. Noting the lack of shelter and low-cost housing in Orange County and
the complex life of the homeless, the court wrote:
156. "Walking through New York's Times Square, one is bombarded with messages. Giant billboards and
flashing neon lights dazzle; marquees beckon; peddlers hawk; preachers beseech; the news warily
wraps around the old Times Building; and, especially around the holidays, the Salvation Army band
plays on. One generally encounters a beggar too. Of all these solicitors, though, the only one subject
to a blanket restriction is the beggar." Loper, supra note 5 at 1039.
157. 902 F.Supp 1084 (1995).
158. "Compassion Fatigue", supra note 7 at 348.
159. Ibid. at 337-338.
160. Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 27 Cal Rptr. 2d 386 (1994).
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The city speciously claims denying petitioners the use of sleeping bags and blankets
outdoors does not outlaw necessities of life because the homeless can sleep some-
where else. Where?... Simply put, as in some vintage oater, petitioners are to clear
out of town by sunset; and that, of course, is what this ordinance is all about, a
blatant and unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel. 1
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However, at the California Supreme Court, Tobe 162 was reversed. In a narrow and
technical reading of the ordinance, the majority found that the plaintiffs could only
exert a facial challenge to the by-law, since they had not proved an "as applied" case
(i.e. that they had been personally affected by the ordinance). They ruled the by-law
did not violate the right to travel, was not unconstitutionally vague, and did not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment. The court maintained that the fact that the City
of Santa Ana had a history of trying to evict homeless persons could not, by inference,
be held to be the purpose of this ordinance when the statute itself did not state so
clearly. If a statute did not have a discriminatory purpose and was constructed in such
a way as to appear to be constitutional, then it would be-and indeed, was-upheld.
It distinguished a similar case, Pottinger v. City of Miami,163 (where a class action
against the city's practice of arresting the homeless for sleeping, standing and congre-
gating in public places was held to violate the right to travel and protection from
unreasonable search and seizure, as well as being overbroad in nature) on the facts
that the plaintiffs in that case could prove they had been personally affected (and
therefore had standing to challenge it "as applied") and that substantial evidence had
been filed with that court as to the City's true intent. 164
Other cases have held that such ordinances are unconstitutionally vague under the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Streetwatch v. National Railroad Passenger
Corporation165 the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against Amtrak
because the "rules of conduct" under which they ejected "undesirables" from the
station ran counter to the "nature of the public invitation to enter and remain in Penn
Station extended by Amtrak"'166 and allowed the exercise of arbitrary enforcement
power by officials. In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville167 an anti-vagrancy law
was deemed imprecise, allowing the police to arrest people because of past or potential
criminality. As in Streetwatch, the Court noted the potential for arbitrary and unfair
161. Ibid. at 393.
162. Tobe et al v. Santa Ana et al, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 (1995) [hereinafter Tobe].
163. 810 F.Supp. 1551 (1992).
164. The dissent of Mosk A.J. in Tobe upheld the appeal court, maintaining that the majority had chosen
to sidestep the real issues in the case. Mosk A.J. also saw the law as being discriminatory in impact,
and pointed out "(t)he City... expressly conceded at oral argument that the purpose of the ordinance
was to address the problem of homeless persons "camping" in public areas, including the parking lot
across from City Hall," concluding "even under a facial analysis we cannot blind ourselves to the
evident intent of the Santa Ana ordinance." Tobe, supra note 162 at 435,437.
165. 875 F.Supp 1055 (1995).
166. Ibid. at 1059.
167. 405 U.S. 156,92 S.Ct. 839 (1972).
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enforcement of the provision and held it violated the due process clause of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
While not pointedly directed at begging, by-laws which regulate the conduct of the
homeless, "vagrants" or "undesirables" implicitly work to achieve the same goal: the
removal of seeming disorder and poverty from the streets.
C. Summary of American Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a case specifically dealing with
anti-panhandling laws. It is clear, however, that cities are trying numerous ways to
address what they see as an overriding problem of public order through ordinances
which penalize behaviour ranging from the actively threatening to the aesthetically
displeasing. The more recent cases show that courts will uphold such ordinances if
they are limited in geographical scope and can show a compelling state interest,
especially if they do not pinpoint locations generally considered to be public fora. This
becomes a bit of a slippery slope: if governments can claim property is not designated
as a public forum (as in the post office sidewalk in Kokinda or the airport terminal in
ISKCON), a more relaxed standard of review will apply and ordinances will tend to
be upheld if they are "reasonably" tailored. As a result, we could see more and more
property being "depublicized." As noted by Millich, "...future decisions will hold
more and more public facilities closed for solicitation or other unpopular activities.
The homeless would thus be unable to beg in any locations where the public congre-
gate...(and) would be out of sight and out of the minds of the people who might come
to their assistance."
168
The larger problem, as noted by writer Peter Marin, is not each single law but the
attitude they communicate taken together: the effective legislating of prejudice against
the poor.16 9 After a decade of fighting such ordinances at the state court level, a pattern
emerges that is distinguishable and discomfiting. The question is open as to whether
the Supreme Court would recognize this larger pattern if and when a case on point
goes to America's highest court. In light of the Schaumburg Trilogy, it is likely that
they would hold that begging is protected speech. However, later cases such as
ISKCON and Kokinda may mean that they will apply a more deferential standard of
review to ordinances which regulate the time, place and manner of such speech. It
remains to be seen if the Supreme Court will extend the protection of the constitution
to the most politically powerless and vulnerable population in America, or whether
they, too, will bow to the "beauty myth" of public order.
V. CONCLUSION
Beggars who contravene panhandling by-laws are not publicly whipped any more; in
our more polite, "civilized" society, they are simply moved out of the way, in the name
of public order. Unless constructive efforts are made to better the beggar's lot-
168. "Compassion Fatigue" supra note 7 at 273.
169. Interview with P. Marin, 28 October 1999.
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through social assistance, genuine employment counseling (as opposed to workfare),
increased housing, and better access to social services-the panhandling by-laws
become an exercise in large-scale social self-deception. Scapegoating beggars and
removing them from sight does a great disservice to the concept of public order. True
public order springs from a democratic community which works openly to address its
problems, and allows all citizens to see, hear and engage in a debate toward their
solutions. In a country governed by a Charter of Rights and Freedoms, we must
remember that rights are not privileges for the wealthy, the educated and the fortunate
alone. They belong to all of us.

